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The Perspectives of Urban Renewal: Reevaluating the
Image of Late Twentieth Century Gentrification of U.S.
Chinatowns - Christian E. Manalac, Temple University
“Most people seem to think more, and improved housing is one of Chinatown’s basic needs. Chinatown
is too small to serve both business and residential purposes… Maybe it would be better if the people moved out
and it was made into an attractive commercial and tourist center.”1
Introduction
The above statement spoken by Temple University History Professor Dr. Sin Ming Chiu in 1969,
represented the tensions within Chinatown communities on the idea of urban renewal. Planners of urban renewal
reimagined cities as places of tourism and feats of modernization that can meet the demands of a new globalized
world. Minority communities such as Chinatown were oftentimes destroyed as a result of these redevelopment
projects to realize the goals of urban planners.2 From the end of World War II to the dawn of the 21st century,
minority neighborhoods all across the United States saw their livelihoods threatened with the rise of urban renewal
projects that sought to revitalize deteriorated cityscapes for the future.
Faced with this challenge to their identities, minority neighborhoods in American cities debated the
value of urban renewal. Many hoped these projects would turn their decayed communities into vibrant living
spaces filled with happy families. But these projects oftentimes failed to help minority neighborhoods and
instead, worked for the interests of the white affluent middle class.3 An intriguing perspective in the urban
renewal debate would be from U.S. Chinatowns who also saw it as a divisive issue. Chinatowns, unlike most
marginalized neighborhoods, benefitted from urban renewal by using financial investments from those projects
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to fuel their cultural tourist economy. But this form of development came at the expense of the communities’
residential needs. This toxic battle between profits and people dominated arguments over development projects
in Chinatowns in the late 20th century and represented the complexity of the issue for many minority
neighborhoods during this era of change.4
This research paper tackles the debates on urban renewal by examining the two Chinatowns of
Philadelphia and Washington D.C. in the postwar era. Specifically, this case study will uncover the patterns,
attitudes and circumstances that led to the survival or destruction of Chinatowns due to redevelopment. Urban
renewal is typically portrayed by the public as a battle between local neighborhoods and urban developers over
city spaces. But the Chinatown debates also uncovered intense inter-community conflict between residents who
saw a need for neighborhood revitalization against others who saw urban renewal as a destructive force.
Chinatown business owners often preferred urban development projects that increased their profit margins,
while homeowners focused on maintaining and improving residential areas. I argue that the Chinatown urban
renewal debates of the 1970s-1990s forced the neighborhoods to make a crucial decision regarding their
communities and redevelopment. The results of that decision created two frameworks of Chinatowns that would
define these communities in the future. Chinatowns either cemented their place as an ethnic enclave for the
Asian community or they became culturally inauthentic Chinatowns dedicated to economic tourism.
Historiography
The phenomenon of urban renewal dominated the histories of American cities during the 20th century.
Laws such as the 1949 and 1954 United States Housing Acts gave many U.S. cities billions of dollars in federal
funds and resources to renovate their urban cores.5 The funds from those laws birthed the first era of urban
renewal from 1949 to 1974, which was a time of mass redevelopment of ghettos across U.S. cities. The
redevelopment of these low-income locations was intended to spur economic development by attracting middle-
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class residents to the urban core.6 In reality, these redevelopment projects eradicated many minority
neighborhoods in the name of “progress” and forced many historic minority communities to move out from
urban spaces they had called home for generations.
In 1964, sociologist Ruth Glass coined the term “gentrification” to describe the process of urban
renewal. Glass’ concept inspired a vast international body of scholarship, which identified gentrification as a
predatory phenomenon that displaced low-income communities for the interests of the white middle class.7
Supporters of gentrification, which oftentimes were urban planners or pro-business community leaders, argued
against Glass’ definition asserting that they only intended to reverse the decline of low-income neighborhoods
through revitalization projects, while opponents of gentrification, such as local community advocates, agreed
with Glass and saw it as a frightening experience that uprooted residents who were typically poor. In their 2017
study of gentrification in Chicago and New York, sociologists Jeffrey M. Timberlake and Elaina Johns Wolfe
indicated various factors that made certain neighborhoods more susceptible to gentrification such as the location
of these neighborhoods to their city’s entertainment districts and economic centers. Other factors included
disinvestment, low-quality housing stock and deteriorating infrastructure common to minority neighborhoods.8
Advocates of urban renewal in the post-war era framed the process as a positive force that brought long overdue
upgrades to deteriorating neighborhoods in the United States. An example of such an advocate would be former
Philadelphia mayor Wilson Goode in 1990 who claimed: “We [city government] made the area [North
Philadelphia] more appealing for public investment, and I think that private dollars will follow.”9 Despite
Mayor Goode’s belief in private investment as a means to revitalize low-income neighborhoods, the horrifying
experiences of the victims of gentrification illustrate the dangers of that mindset.
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Millions of minorities around the U.S. saw their neighborhoods demolished in the name of
beautification. Derek S. Hyra demonstrated the debilitating effects of gentrification: “By 1963 more than
609,000 people had been displaced because of redevelopment projects… Of the 609,000 people displaced by
1963, two thirds (406,000) were racial minorities, mostly African-Americans.”10 As for the reasoning for this
targeted destruction of minorities, Chuo Li elaborates, “To recapture the centrally located neighborhoods
occupied by minorities after the whites moved out, urban renewal was employed as a mechanism to reclaim
central urban spaces and reshape the city’s racial contours…”11 In response, minorities organized protests
against gentrification and oftentimes found their own neighborhoods divided on the issue.
The dilapidated state of minority communities before the advent of major urban renewal projects can be
attributed to the racially motivated policies of the U.S. government and attitudes of white middle-class
Americans. When African Americans and other minorities migrated to cities for work after World War I, their
sheer numbers overcrowded urban spaces, overloaded city services, and increased competition for jobs. In order
to preserve the cities’ services and spaces for whites, governments and private interests at all levels
implemented racial segregation policies to keep minorities in check. Racial policies such as zoning reserved
ownership of single-family housing to whites, while mortgage loan lending guidelines by the Federal Housing
Association included racially restrictive requirements that prohibited homeowners from selling their homes to
minorities. In addition, minorities could not move out of these decayed neighborhoods easily, as policies such
as redlining explicitly excluded minority neighborhoods for financial loans based on its racist tiering system of
urban spaces, and private covenants or contracts by homeowners excluded minorities from buying housing
outside their designated areas.12 These exclusionary policies and the growing popularity of suburban housing in
the 1930s-1950s spawned the idea of “white flight” in which “white Americans move from the urban core to
surrounding suburban communities for fear that their property’s value will decrease as a result of African
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Americans moving into the neighborhood.”13 As a result of these racist policies, many minority neighborhoods
were trapped in deteriorating spaces as public investments went to the suburbs, financial loans that could have
been used to improve minority neighborhoods were denied by banks, and race divisions deepened as whites
unjustly blamed minorities for the ruined state of cities.14 The idea of urban renewal, brought to life by the
Housing Acts after World War II, provided an opportunity for many minority neighborhoods to escape the cycle
of poverty that destroyed their communities. The choice to trust the government to rectify its discriminatory
housing practices of the past spurred heated debate within minority communities in the U.S. on how to improve
the conditions of their neighborhoods.
Conflicts over urban renewal occurred not only between neighborhoods and the city, but between
different groups within communities as well. An example of this would be the divisions in the African
American community of Roxbury in Boston in the 1960s over the value of urban renewal. Liberal minded
African American residents advocated for further racial integration of the neighborhood by promoting the
creation of racially integrated and modernized development projects that could help dispel ghettos in the city.
Skeptical community members, on the other hand, realized the destructive potential of urban renewal and
sought to stop the projects completely.15 The internal divisions within Roxbury revealed a truth too often
ignored: minority communities were not monolithic in their thoughts on gentrification and struggled to come to
a consensus on the issue.
A powerful sense of community in residential neighborhoods can be a major roadblock to urban
planners due to their potential to protest harmful urban policy as a collective body. Neighborhood community
can be defined as a resident’s trust in their neighborhood, sense of belonging in the neighborhood and the belief
that any needs by the neighborhood can be accomplished by relying on members in the neighborhood.16 Josh
Gibbons, Michael S. Barton, and Timothy T. Reling focuses on this feeling of neighborhood community by
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examining gentrified and non-gentrified neighborhoods in Philadelphia. Their findings reveal that gentrified
neighborhoods had less neighborhood community than non-gentrified neighborhoods.17
One of the aspects of the gentrification debate between cities and minority communities would be the
belief that it could be a positive force for neighborhoods. As described by Robert J. Chaskin and Mark L.
Joseph, “Positive Gentrification” is “public policy that harnesses private capital and market forces to attract
higher-income residents and generate neighborhood revitalization while attempting to reduce segregation and
foster inclusion.”18 However, the main goal of positive gentrification seeks to integrate low-income residents
and high income residents to not only resolve the poverty in these neighborhood, but create a positive
relationship between the two communities.19 The authors conducted their study on the merits of “Positive
Gentrification” by monitoring three mixed-income communities in the city of Chicago. For the results of that
research, Chaskin and Joseph found that despite the economic improvement of these neighborhoods through
this mixed-development plan it failed to truly integrate low-income residents into the community as equal
partners. The societal and attitudinal differences between low and high-income communities has caused lower
income peoples to feel discriminated against due to their behavioral norms, stereotypes involving race, class and
discomfort of living next to each other.20 Although mixed-income communities can improve the poor conditions
of low income neighborhoods, failing to establish a positive relationship with the very people it aims to help is a
severe roadblock for positive gentrification to be a viable mechanism of change for these communities.
At the time of postwar urban renewal projects, Asian communities such as Chinatowns experienced
mass immigration in the late 20th century that significantly increased the population of their neighborhoods.
According to Jackelyn Hwang, the sudden influx of Asian immigrants to the U.S. spawned improved economic
and social conditions for minority neighborhoods by increasing housing demand, populating vacant residential

Gibbons, Joseph, Michael S Barton, and Timothy T Reling, “Do Gentrifying Neighbourhoods Have Less Community? Evidence
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blocks and commercial storefronts.21 The benefits of immigration to these low-income neighborhoods brought
fears that these immigrants could potentially attract gentrifiers and urban planners to take advantage of the
immigration wave in these minority neighborhoods with targeted urban planning projects. Hwang notes that
although the immigration wave revitalized ethnic enclaves it also failed to spawn massive renewal projects and
a movement of middle-class white residents in other low-income neighborhoods. Asians and to a certain extent
Hispanics acted as “pioneers” of gentrification in low-income communities. The study highlights the impacts of
immigration on gentrification and how they can spur new waves of urban development to occur in low-income
communities.22 The immigration waves of the 1960s-1970s benefitted Chinatowns with immense economic
benefits in terms of businesses and workers, but ultimately also helped put these neighborhoods on the map as
cultural hotspots for their cities.
During the late twentieth century urban renewal waves, Chinatowns had long relied on strategies of
cultural tourism to survive.23 Chinatown communities successfully marketed themselves as tourist hotspots,
which attracted consumers and financial investments to their streets. Scholars of urban planning Anastasia
Loukaitou-Sideris and Konstantina Soureli explain that the “tangible benefits of cultural tourism may include
job creation for local residents, increased business for local merchants who often struggle to maintain small or
ethnic businesses, and amenities such as physical and social infrastructure improvements, as well as safety,
which can all benefit both residents and tourists.”24 But centering development on cultural tourism risked the
residential community at the heart of these neighborhoods. Nancy Leong expands on the idea of cultural
tourism with the idea of racial capitalism which takes advantage of race one’s racial identity to gain social or
economic benefits. Racial capitalism surrenders the control of one’s racial identity outsiders to influence and

Hwang, Jackelyn, “Pioneers of Gentrification: Transformation in Global Neighborhoods in Urban America in the Late Twentieth
Century,” Demography 53, no. 1 (2016): 190.
22
Jackelyn, “Pioneers of Gentrification: Transformation in Global Neighborhoods in Urban America in the Late Twentieth Century,”
190, 210.
23
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Konstantina Soureli, “Cultural Tourism as an Economic Development Strategy for Ethnic
Neighborhoods,” Economic Development Quarterly 26, no. 1 (February 2012): 50. Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris and Konstantina
Soureli note that cultural tourism focuses on “the mosaic of neighborhoods and places, their traditions, art forms, celebrations, and
experiences that reflect the diversity of city space.”
24
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potentially control for profit. In exchange for the commodification of race, non-white racial identities for
exploited.25 Chinatowns represent the duality of racial capitalism and cultural tourism. Was Chinatown a forprofit venture for businesses or a culturally authentic neighborhood that catered to the Asian community?
Chinatowns across the United States grappled with different visions of their neighborhoods’ futures.
Chinatowns faced specific challenges compared to other ethnically defined neighborhoods in the
postwar era. According to Urban Studies scholars Domenic Vitiello and Zoe Blickenderfer, Chinatowns “were
targeted more often for roads, highways, civic centers, public and office buildings, and other downtown
development; and in the postwar period generally not for wholesale clearance and redevelopment like many
African American neighborhoods.”26 This was due to the geographical location of Chinatowns in the urban
cores of cities which increased the likelihood of Chinatown’s assimilation by urban planners for their economic
initiatives. In order to resist gentrification, Chinatowns created “Save Chinatown movements,” which spawned
various community development organizations and advocacy groups that helped change the perspectives of city
planners to preserve Chinatown rather than destroy it.27 In this war over city spaces, Chinatowns had two
options to ensure the survival of their neighborhoods. The first option had Chinatowns become what AsianAmerican activists called “ethnic Disneylands'' or cultural theme parks for tourists, while the second
emphasized Chinatown’s cultural authenticity as vital enclaves for ethnic minorities.28 The histories of
Washington D.C. and Philadelphia’s Chinatowns can reveal the factors that led to the defeats or triumphs of
Chinatowns in response to urban renewal.
Endless Conflict: Philadelphia’s Chinatown and Gentrification in the 1950s-1980s
The beginning of Philadelphia’s Chinatown battle with gentrification involved the Comprehensive Plan
devised by the city in 1960. This Comprehensive Plan like others of its time outlined the costs, benefits,
rationales of all urban development for the city. The plan’s main goals focused on providing better living
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conditions for residents and a competitive edge to attract people to the city instead of the suburbs or other U.S.
cities.29 The main case of gentrification that Philadelphia’s Chinatown faced during the 1970s-1980s would be
the attempted removal of the Holy Redeemer Church for a ramp for the Vine Street Expressway in 1973.
Although, the expressway’s completion permanently damaged Chinatown’s viability as an ethnic enclave, the
efforts of the neighborhood’s protest movement saved the church from certain destruction. Unlike Chinatowns
such as D.C which fell to gentrification, Philadelphia’s Chinatown proved that urban planners could not
redevelop any neighborhood at will. Philadelphia’s Chinatown’s successful preservation of the Holy Redeemer
Church demonstrated that minority neighborhoods needed to protest against gentrification and that they could
win against urban planners.30
When the Holy Redeemer Church opened its doors to worshippers 1941, it was the first church built to
serve Catholic Chinese peoples in the entire western hemisphere.31 For Philadelphia Chinatown, the church also
served as the heart of the neighborhood, described by the Philadelphia Inquirer as “Chinatowns’ church,
school, recreational and cultural center.”32 The church’s location on 10th and Vine Streets sat on the path of
PennDOT’s 54-million-dollar planned expressway. George Moy, a construction supervisor for the Philadelphia
Housing Authority, emphasized the importance of the Church to Chinatown: “If Holy Redeemer goes and there
is no replacement of comparable facilities… I would almost bet my dollar that a sizable portion of the Catholic
Community would pack its bags and leave.”33 The Redeemer’s removal would put an end to many Catholic
Chinese and other Asians from living or visiting Chinatown to attend church services. Additionally, the church
was the only educational facility in the neighborhood and taught most if not all of Chinatown’s youth. Although
the plans only called for the demolition of the Church, the survival of the school and the Redeemer’s other
services were also put in jeopardy by the project.34 According to Sister Thomas Mary of the church “Families
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will be seriously disrupted and young people with leadership capabilities are being forced to move.”35 The
possible destruction of the church would guarantee the destruction of the community.
According to proponents of the plan, the construction of the Vine Street Expressway promised to
alleviate traffic going into and out of the city. Philadelphia faced immense gridlock as workers from the suburbs
commuted to the city for their jobs. This also impeded tourism and deterred potential residents from moving to
the city. City planners devised the Vine Street Expressway to lessen the burden on the 2,100 miles of local
streets that were consistently packed with drivers. Philadelphia desperately needed this expressway in order to
connect with outer suburbs and ease the headaches of drivers looking to get around in the city.36
However, the construction of the Vine Street Expressway acted as part of a prolonged process by
Philadelphia urban planners to remove Chinatown permanently. This process of removal began in the early 20th
century, when Philadelphia’s urban planners began to chip away at Chinatowns borders with “City Beautiful”
projects. According to Vitiello and Blickenderfer, many urban planners saw the removal of minority spaces as
“synonymous with destroying the cramped jumble of land uses breeding vice, disease, and other social ills that
Chinatowns represented to reformers.”37 Local newspapers supported the arguments by urban planners. The
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin depicted Chinatown as a ghettoized dump that had to be removed from the
cityscape. The Evening Bulletin printed several derogatory headlines calling for the neighborhood’s demise
including, “‘City’s Chinatown Soon Only Memory: Modern Commerce Clawing at Heart of Area, While
Residents Sit Unperturbed…,’ and ‘Dwindling Race Street Chinatown Doomed by Opening of Bridge and
House of Hundred Rooms among Those to Vanish as Bland Orientals See Garage Rise on Site Where Pipes and
Fan-Tan flourished.’”38 These headlines created the image that Chinatown’s destruction was inevitable and that
the residents were ignorant of the obliteration of their neighborhood. City planners in the 1970s, however, did
not foresee the resistance of many Chinatown residents.
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One of the major sources of resistance came from an underground local Chinatown publication called
Yellow Seeds, which ran from 1972-1977. Printed by an organization founded by local college students, the
Yellow Seeds wrote about urban renewal efforts in both English and Mandarin, which allowed the entire
community in Chinatown, the suburbs, and college campuses to learn about the most pressing issues that
affected the Asian-American community.39 The Yellow Seeds provided much needed coverage on Chinatown’s
gentrification battles and brought to the communities’ attention of the need to mobilize against the designs of
urban planners. One of the newspaper’s most crucial reports highlighted the spontaneous protest by Chinatown
youth against the destruction of the Holy Redeemer in 1973, where they stated:
At 7:30AM, demonstrators consisting mainly of residents and people who worked in Chinatown,
assembled around the site, and asked the forman [sic] to stop the work. After being refused and ignored,
the demonstrators climbed onto the rubble in spite of the running crane and tractor and the flying debris.
The workmen were forced to stop and the group remained on the rubble.40

The Philadelphia Inquirer offered a different version of the same events: “‘For three days, young people from
Chinatown demonstrated and finally stopped the demolition by lying in front of the machines. Some climbed
the hills of the rubble and refused to come down.’”41 The key differences between both reports illustrated how
each side saw the demolition of the church. The Philadelphia Inquirer, whose audience was the whole city,
depicted the event more neutrally and less dramatized than the Yellow Seeds report, which told Chinatown
residents of the heroism shown by the protestors who risked their lives dodging flying debris to defend their
neighborhood from intrusive city interests. What differentiated these two depictions even further would be how
the Inquirer framed the issue. The headline and ending of the article upheld long-held stereotypes by city
planners of Chinatown as a crime-filled ghetto, Rod Townley of the Inquirer reported Chinatown as “A
neighborhood beset with cruising prostitutes and flattened housing…” Then after Townley described Chinatown
as a somewhat decent neighborhood to live in, he concluded with: “the cold hard truth remains. Chinatown’s

Wilson, Ethnic Renewal in Philadelphia’s Chinatown, 423-425.
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future is in the hands of outsiders.”42 These polarizing accounts by the Philadelphia Inquirer and Yellow Seeds
illustrated the divide between the Chinatown community and the public on the image and future of Chinatown.
Like other urban neighborhoods, Chinatown was made up of various groups that represented the
community and whose views on urban renewal fluctuated during the process. Before the attempted removal of
the Holy Redeemer, the editors of the Yellow Seeds were skeptically optimistic about urban renewal. In their
first volume in 1972, they deduced “If Chinatown is to remain intact as a vital community and not as just a
collection of shops and restaurants, more housing and community services for the growing population and
increasing number of immigrants must be provided. The community and the City, to be sure, must work
together in order to accomplish this.”43 Despite knowing that the city held negative images of Chinatown, the
Yellow Seeds urged the Chinese community to collaborate with urban planners to foster meaningful change for
the neighborhood. This lofty sentiment would change five years later when the editors of the publication
professed, “In the Chinatown housing struggle, we fell into the trap set by the city. We forgot our past
experiences and lessons— that the government cannot and will not serve the interests of the people.”44 The
Yellow Seeds were hopeful that they could work together with city planners to make gentrification work for
their community and over time saw their hopes fade due to the actions of urban planners towards Chinatown.
The city had divided Chinatown into North and South sides due to the Vine Street Expressway, boxed the
community on all sides by additional urban renewal projects, and then neglected Chinatown’s requests for
solutions to their housing issues.45 The Yellow Seeds’ trust towards the city’s redevelopment efforts had been
repeatedly strained to the point that they concluded that only through protests could they save Chinatown.
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A foundational member of the organization and one of its most vocal leaders, Mary Yee came to
Philadelphia in 1970 to study urban planning and quickly became embroiled in the battle to save Chinatown
from city planners. Yee’s empathy with the predicament of Philadelphia’s Chinatown can be attributed to her
experiences of growing up in Boston’s Chinatown:
I was interested in community development. Because in Boston, major highways had taken half of the
housing in Chinatown. I noticed a big difference, because that has caused a lot of Chinese population to
disperse to the suburbs and surrounding area. So the neighborhood was no longer cohesive. A lot of
social relationships were difficult to maintain… In Boston I had seen what had happened and I also felt
strongly about social justice. So, when I came to Philadelphia and started to get to know Chinatown, it
was clear that they had these problems on the horizon…46

Having experienced the horrors of gentrification personally, Yee made it her mission to ensure that
Philadelphia’s Chinatown did not fall to ruin like Boston’s Chinatown. Community unity was the key to saving
Chinatown, and thus the Yellow Seeds took a practical approach to spreading their message by word of mouth
and conversation: “We would go deliver our papers in the restaurants and we’d sit and chat with people or meet
them on the street and chat with them about stuff, or they’d ask us questions about the articles. . . . People
wouldn’t overtly say they agreed, but it certainly started discussions.”47 Despite not being a native to
Philadelphia, Yee exhibited a sense of loyalty and pride to fight for Chinatown’s survival.
Not all residents of Chinatown appreciated the inflammatory rhetoric of the Yellow Seeds. The Chinese
Benevolent Association (CBA), the unofficial leaders of Chinatown, looked at the rhetoric of the youth
organization with skepticism and disdain. The CBA’s function in Chinatown “focused on resolving internal
conflicts between individuals, associations, and businesses; providing mutual assistance; and managing housing,
turning outward only when larger ‘treaty rights’ were involved. The CBA was largely composed of older
Chinese-born men, many of whom did not speak English (or at least not fluently).”48 Mary Yee explained the
position of the leadership of the CBA in a later interview: “The elders’ attitude was that only they could speak
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for Chinatown, that the second generation was too Americanized, and that ‘you can’t fight city hall.’”49 Much of
the leadership of the CBA had little if any interactions with City Hall due to language constraints and ethnic
conflict that forced many Chinatown residents to keep to themselves.50 As a result, the CBA did not have the
technical knowledge to fight against urban renewal and thus were convinced that the community could not
“fight city hall.” The CBA’s personal pride hinted at by Yee, through their attitude towards leadership, also
meant that they would accept no one but themselves to represent Chinatown. According to the Yellow Seeds,
without the expertise and knowledge of Chinatown’s young activists, the CBA’s leadership would have
certainly lead Chinatown down the road of ruin.
One of the biggest obstacles to a youth-elderly coalition would be T.T Chang, the self-proclaimed
“mayor” of Chinatown. Chang had immortalized himself in the community with the creation of the Chinese
Cultural and Community Center in 1955 and his revival of the Chinese New Year Parade.”51 Despite his
position, Chang’s reputation within the neighborhood was mixed at best. Former director of personnel for
Chiang Kai-Shek in China, Chang immigrated to America in 1952 to escape communism and established his
position in the inner workings of Philadelphia’s Chinatown through his membership in the Young Men’s
Christian Association (YMCA).52 Unlike his CBA counterparts, Chang utilized his influence within the
organization to forge important connections with powerful city bureaucrats and other officials as the self-made
“mayor of Chinatown”. Chang’s unorthodox methods and immigrant status earned him the ire of some members
of the community who called him an outsider and an “arrogant son of bitch” for his courting of influential nonChinese contacts.53 Chang’s goal for Chinatown was to “promote a positive image of Philadelphia’s Chinatown
aimed at counteracting older stereotypes and addressing blight in the community”54 Chang sought to redevelop
Chinatown through urban renewal and aimed “to leverage the possibility of creating Chinatown as a tourist
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destination showcasing ancient Chinese culture to secure monies for redevelopment.”55 Unlike the elderly
leaders in the CBA, Chang’s impressive leadership over the CBA and other community figures in Chinatown
made him a revered figure in the neighborhood, praised for his committed initiatives to make Chinatown great
again.
The image of Chinatown as a tourist site enraged the members of the Yellow Seeds, who believed Chang
was selling out the neighborhood for profits. The Yellow Seeds barraged Chang with numerous articles that
criticized his vision for Chinatown, with headlines such as “T. T. Chang: Who Is He Really Helping?” and “Let
us all watch out for the people in the community who try to sell us out.”56 The Yellow Seeds challenged Chang
for his silence in the face of the Vine Street Expressway and unwillingness to use his connections with the
media, politicians, and members of the business community to fight city hall. Chang’s only comment towards
the issue was, “I don’t like the word fight” to which Mary Yee rebuked, “Well we’re not afraid of the word
fight.”57 The differences between the second generation and elderly leadership in Chinatown often resulted in
open conflict. Chinatown’s future hinged on a compromise amongst the militant youth like Yellow Seeds and
old guard paragons like T.T Chang.
A divided Chinatown stood no chance at surviving the aggressive efforts of urban planners, and thus
compromises had to be made in order to unite the entirety of Chinatown against gentrification. Cecilia Moy
Yep, a youth leader not associated with the Yellow Seeds, adopted a moderate stance in comparison to her
“radical” counterparts and attempted to form a committee under the CBA to represent Chinatown in the urban
renewal debates. In an interview on the difficulties of that process, Yep remarked:
We had to organize. But if you’re going to organize as a new group, claiming to represent Chinatown or
part of Chinatown, you were dragged head on into the Chinese Benevolent Association. They were an
established organization in Chinatown. I don’t know just who would recognize them as being but they
are, like with the city officials at that time. To have a community fighting amongst themselves as to
who’s the leader, the city’ll just come right in and bowl you over… . So we acknowledged that we
would be a committee under them, not threaten their prestige or their claim. We knew we just had to
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either respect them, or we had to fight them and, on the other hand, fight the government. . . . We didn’t
challenge their authority; we acknowledged their superiority.58
Yep’s willingness to work with the CBA marked one of the first instances in which elderly and youth leadership
of a Chinatown collaborated. The committee Yep and the CBA created would soon become the Philadelphia
Chinatown Development Corporation (PCDC), Chinatown’s premier organization which led the effort for urban
redevelopment projects that would benefit residents.
The Yellow Seeds may have questioned elders such as T.T Chang on his methods, but they never lost
sight of the goal of saving Chinatown. Mary Yee described their role in the movement as the “loyal opposition”
whose goal was to remind the community that they were all on the same team. She suggested that the “threat to
community survival prompted the different sectors of the community to bridge generational, religious,
educational, and geographical boundaries,” and that “by establishing [an] identity as a community and by being
a public presence in political forums and in the media during the early years, [Chinatown] became a force to be
reckoned with.”59 At the end of the day, however, the Expressway successfully divided the community into
north and south sides and opened the door for urban renewal projects such as the Gallery Mall and the
Philadelphia Convention Center to be built. But crucially the expressway also became the catalyst for
Chinatown to unite against gentrification and forced urban planners to alter their plans to accommodate for
Chinatown’s demands. This pivotal victory over gentrification validated the activism of Philadelphia’s
Chinatown and encouraged the community to continue their movement to ensure that their neighborhood would
never fall to urban planners.
Capital of Renewal: D. C’s Chinatown and Gentrification from the 1970s-1990s
The Chinatowns of Washington D.C. and Philadelphia had vastly different responses to gentrification in
the 1970s-1990s. Washington D.C.’s Chinatown battle over gentrification began with the 1950 Comprehensive
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Plan by D.C. urban planners who drafted future redevelopment projects for the city.60 The announcement of
D.C.’s first convention center and sports complexes in 1972 disrupted the peace of Chinatown residents.
Planned to be built in the heart of the Chinatown neighborhood, the project was projected to encompass eight
city blocks and destroy over 129 Chinese businesses.61 In 1972, self-proclaimed community leaders held a
modest protest against the convention center that forced urban planners to move the project several blocks away
from Chinatown and promise to preserve the neighborhood.62 In exchange, community leaders and Chinatown
merchants worked with the city to transform Chinatown into a “tourist” spot.63 This agreement between the
Chinatown community and D.C. planners reminded residents of the 1920s when; Chinatown was almost
permanently removed from the city due to the Federal Triangle project, which sought to replace Chinatown with
“federal, district and cultural buildings.”64 At that time, Chinatown residents made compromises with D.C. to
relocate the neighborhood to another part of the city to survive. The Triangle project instilled a sense of dread
within the community that they could be removed at any time by urban planners.65 The 1972 D.C. convention
center tested the mettle of Chinatown to subvert urban planners and guarantee the neighborhood’s survival.
The leaders of D.C.’s Chinatown acquiesced the neighborhood to urban renewal in the hope that it
would revitalize the community with economic investments, while Philadelphia’s took to the streets to
vehemently reject urban renewal on the grounds that it destroyed the very communities it sought to “help”.
However, by the time of its completion in 1982, the DC convention center had displaced 13% of the total
population (60 of the 487 total residents) in the neighborhood and attracted private developers who wished to
take advantage of the available property to transform Chinatown into an bustling tourist destination for visitors
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to Washington D.C.66 Despite D.C. and Philadelphia’s Chinatowns shared ethnic identities, the communities of
their cities tackled gentrification in completely opposite ways. D.C.’s Chinatown also had intra-community
conflict between pro-business and pro-community advocates, but their Chinatown was represented by two
completely different populations from the suburbs and inner city. This population difference favored the
suburbs and titled D.C.’s Chinatown to support gentrification instead of rejecting it. Unable to unite its entire
community against gentrification, D.C.’s Chinatown became the prime example of a Chinatown co-opted by
urban planners.67
One of the primary factors to D.C.’s demise as a cultural neighborhood would be the population makeup
of the city. A 1973 study by D.C.’s Redevelopment Land Agency showed that the Chinese-American
population in D.C. nearly doubled between 1960 and 1970 from 4,156 to 8,298 residents.68 Although
Chinatown’s population expanded a wave of immigration in the 1950s-1970s, Vitiello and Acolin noted that
this influx may have weakened the community, as that wave was “part of a broader shift from the old pattern of
immigrant settlement in central city enclaves to a new prevalence of locating directly in suburbs.”69 The shift in
D.C. was even more extreme since most of the residents in the 1973 study lived in the suburbs.70 Newer
immigrants did not see Chinatown as their “home” since they did not live there and only went to Chinatown for
its amenities and services just like tourists. Signs of this settlement pattern emerged as early as 1972, when
Betty Medsger of the Post described Saturdays in Chinatown as “slow” days for the community due to the lack
of automobile traffic from office workers in the suburbs. However, come Sundays and during the Chinese New
Year, Chinatown witnessed periodic revivals with the business of Chinese suburbanites filling the neighborhood
with life. Based on these differences, Medsger concluded that “The two worlds of Washington’s Chinese-the
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inner-city Chinatown and the suburban dispersal- are very different.”71 In the debates over urban renewal, Asian
residents within D.C. competed with their suburban counterparts to determine which “community” represented
Chinatown. Two leaders emerged as representatives of these communities and their interests: Dr. Toon Lee (Dr.
Lee) sought to utilize urban renewal to preserve Chinatown’s image as a residential haven for families and Dr.
William Chin Lee (Dr. Chin Lee) plowed the way for Chinatown’s as a business empire focused on tourism.72
Dr. Toon Lee came to Washington D.C. from China when he immigrated to the U.S. in 1948.73 In
addition to his work as a local physician for the neighborhood and in the city’s health department, Dr. Lee’s
involvement in Chinatown largely stemmed from his work as president of the D.C. branch of the Chinese
Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) founded in 1940.74 This organization catered to new immigrants
and long-time residents alike by providing them with services in healthcare and education, settling local
disputes, burying the dead, upholding Chinese traditions, and answering other neighborhood needs. As
Chinatown’s unofficial spokesperson, Dr. Lee often represented the community in interviews with the
Washington Post for celebrations such as the Chinese New Year.75 Dr. Lee identified the poor housing in the
community as one of the major issues for the neighborhood. He called the aged homes in the neighborhood
“antiques” on the verge of falling apart. In a 1989 interview, Dr. Lee expressed a need for urban redevelopment
in Chinatown but exclaimed that outside developers “Say they want to enhance Chinatown. They don’t want to
enhance us, they want to squeeze us out.”76 Dr. Lee believed that urban renewal could help revitalize
Chinatown, but also understood that the people of Chinatown were not the beneficiaries of those projects.
Despite the historic legacy of the CCBA, the association had lost much of its power in the community by the
1970s due to the immigration wave of the 1960s-1970s. As Chinatown’s inner-city residents dwindled, so did

71

Betty Medsger, "Chinatown Not Home to most Chinese: Chinatown is no Longer Home to most Washington Chinese," The
Washington Post, Times Herald, Dec 05, 1972.
72
Stephen J. Lynton, "Far East Center to be Built in D.C.'s Chinatown: Far East Center to be Built in D.C.'s Chinatown," The
Washington Post, May 13, 1983.
73
Hathaway and Ho Stephanie, "Small but Resilient: Washington's Chinatown over the Years," 47.
74
“About Us,” Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of Washington, DC.
75
Ellen Hoffman, "Dragons Cavort on H. Street," The Washington Post, Times Herald, Oct 12, 1970.
76
Kathy Ann Waterman, "Chinatown: The Old Vs. the New: Chinatown Fights Battle to Preserve its Heritage," The Washington
Post, Dec 02, 1989.

23

the power of the CCBA since less people required their services.77 For housing and other issues, the CCBA
failed to confront the rise of gentrification in the 1970s.
On the other side of the debate was Dr. William Chin Lee, born, raised, and educated in Washington.
Serving as an internal medical doctor for the community until his retirement in 1982, Dr. Chin Lee also made a
name for himself in politics.78 In 1972, he competed against Jerry A. Moore, the Republican Party’s favored
candidate and former city councilman, and Gen. Hassan Jeru Ahmed in a three-way battle for the Republican
nomination for the House of Representatives.79 Against four to one odds, Dr. Chin Lee won the election by a
razor thin margin of seventeen votes against the favored Moore.80 Despite losing the general election for
delegate against the Democratic incumbent Walter E. Fauntroy, Dr. Chin Lee had won respect for the Asian
community at a time when racial tensions diminished minority representation in politics.81 Taking his successes
in politics to Chinatown, Dr. Chin Lee hoped to save the neighborhood by utilizing his political experience and
connections to help spur Chinatown’s transformation into a tourist paradise.
The beginning of the end for D.C.’s Chinatown started with a proclamation for a new trading center for
Chinatown in 1983 by the Chinatown Development Corporation, an organization made up of thirty-four
Chinatown business members. Dr. Chin Lee, at that point the president of the CDC, proudly announced “We
see this project as the first step in an effort to make Washington, D.C. a major gateway for trade and cultural
exchanges between the U.S. and the Far East.”82 The 1973 study mentioned previously also revealed that both
the Chinatown community and Chinese business owners wanted a Chinese Trade and Community Center to
boost the neighborhood’s local economy and provide much needed neighborhood services.83 The land of the
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trading center was being leased by D.C.’s Metro Transit Authority and they only selected the CDC’s bid for the
land. Dr. Lee, alongside other fellow community advocates, were unsuccessful in their attempts to be a part of
the project and thus were completely excluded from the venture. The bias of the Metro Transit Authority
towards Dr. Chin Lee’s group was attributed to the “overwhelming” support by D.C. agencies for the trade
center.84 A possible rationale for this bias has to do with American foreign policy and President Richard
Nixon’s 1972 visit to China reestablishing U.S.-Chinese relations. Dr. Chin Lee’s 1972 campaign resonated
with American foreign policy, urban planners, and Chinatown businessmen alike where he wanted “to allow
people to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps.”85 Dr. Chin Lee’s vision for Chinatown supported the idea
of the “American Dream” by giving businesses in Chinatown the best opportunities to succeed made possible
by urban renewal. The coalition of city planners and the CDC had effectively excluded one part of Chinatown
in the gentrification process. Dr. Chin Lee’s CDC paved the way for the economic metamorphosis of the
neighborhood and left community activists such as Dr. Lee in the dark.86
A resident of the area for twenty years, Dr. Lee witnessed the agonizing decline of Chinatown as a
residential neighborhood through his own eyes. The opening of Chinatown to urban renewal projects such as
convention center and trading center led to a significant rise in property taxes for the neighborhood that forced
out many Chinatown residents. By 1986, only half of Dr. Lee’s patients were Chinese. In 1986, the Post noted
that “Lee’s parents three-story row house had an assessed value of $66,750 in 1977, $285,000 in 1982 and
$695,000 this year, almost entirely attributable to increases in the value of the land.”87 Land value and high
property taxes reserved Chinatown’s spaces for outside developers or business owners who handled the costs
with ease. No lower income family could afford the exponential increase in taxes. Dr. Lee echoed fears of the
remaining D.C. Chinatown residents that “eventually there will be a Chinatown with no Chinese… Many of the
large developers are non-Chinese. The development in Chinatown is a positive step, but not if we cannot stay
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here when it is all over.”88 Resigned to the fate of Chinatown’s transformation into an urban developer’s
sandbox, Dr. Lee knew it was only a matter of time before the Chinese would be completely forced out of D.C.
By 1995, D.C.’s Chinatown was well underway into becoming the one of the city’s most popular
development sites. For new residents, D.C.’s Chinatown was “like a train station: When the train arrives, you
take it to the next destination." These words by Dr. Lee perfectly described the state of Chinatown by 1995.
Chinatown had long served as a community where immigrant families could plant their roots and raise children;
now it was merely a pitstop for immigrants on their way to the suburbs. The residents of Chinatown were
completely defeated, and even Chinese businessmen who benefitted from recent development projects felt the
pressure of gentrification. For example, in 1995, Tony Cheng, who owned multiple properties and two
restaurants in Chinatown, noted that business in the area had been bad in recent years and he was willing to sell
to developers for the right price. By 1995, Chinatown residents at the Wah Luck House, an apartment building
built in 1982, accepted that Chinatown was no longer an ethnic enclave and found it foolish that they once
thought the Wah Luck House symbolized Chinatown’s resistance to gentrification. Residents believed that the
construction of Wah Luck alongside the new Chinese Far East Center, showed that their voices were being
heard by urban planners and that they could survive as a residential community. Contrary to their hopes
however, D.C.’s Chinatown devolved into a bidding war among outside interests over available spaces in
Chinatown. By 1995, Dr. Lee concluded, “History moves on” and perhaps that was fitting for this once vibrant
neighborhood.89
Washington D.C.’s Chinatown at first claimed its spot in D.C as an oasis for Chinese immigrants who
escaped racism to find a new home. The end of the neighborhood’s authentic Chinatown in the 1970s-1990s
began when community and business leaders allowed the construction of a convention center that sapped the
community of its cultural vitality. Trends in immigration catered to the suburban Asian population and resulted
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in their interests being prioritized over the residents of Chinatown. Despite being at one point the commanding
president of the CCBA, Dr. Toon Lee was powerless to contest Dr. William Chin Lee’s CDC. Chinatown’s
residential and business leaders had been divided and conquered by external interests. By 1995, the
neighborhood became a free for all amongst urban developers as external interests bought out land from
Chinese businessmen and homeowners alike. Tourists and D.C. Asian suburbanites benefitted the most from
urban renewal projects and completely destroyed the authentic culture of D.C’s Chinatown.90 The pivotal period
of the 1970s to the 1990s transformed D.C.’s Chinatown into an ethnic Disneyland for tourists far removed
from its beginnings as a sanctuary for Asian immigrants.
Conclusion
The choices that the Chinatowns in D.C. and Philadelphia utilized in the 1970s and 1980s influenced
how those communities face the issue of gentrification today. Philadelphia’s Chinatown now attempts to seize
its own destiny and reclaim the lands they lost to gentrification in the 1970s. The neighborhood sustained
intergenerational coalitions from the 1970s alive through the Philadelphia Chinatown Development
Corporation, which dedicated themselves to urban redevelopment projects that would improve the lives of its
residents. One such reclamation conflict is playing out in the neighborhood of Callowhill, or Chinatown North,
a space the neighborhood lost when the Vine Street Expressway was constructed. Since 2018, the PCDC has led
the fight to recover their “rightful'' spaces of Chinatown North against the wishes of the majority white
population of Callowhill, with both groups claiming these spaces as their own.91 The PCDC believed that the
non-English speaking residents of Chinatown North were being excluded in talks regarding Callowhill’s
Business Improvement Bill, a plan that funded future development projects in the neighborhood. Chinatown
leadership saw this as another deliberate attempt by white “outsiders” to prevent minorities from having a voice
in community development. Although the PCDC made some progress in reclaiming Chinatown North with the
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construction of the Crane Tower Apartments in 2019, the conflict with the Callowhill residents in North
Chinatown suggest that another fight over urban space is brewing once again.92 Philadelphia’s Chinatown faces
the dilemma of community inclusion and how to make urban renewal work for all actors involved. How do two
distinct ethnic communities with competing claims to city spaces reconcile their differences? Whether it is
minority or white communities, do any of these groups have greater claims to the city? Chinatown’s prior
successes against the Vine Street Expressway in 1973, a Phillies Stadium in 2001, and other urban renewal
projects have taught the community that a “culture of protest” works in the fight against gentrification. In the
21st century, how can Philadelphia’s Chinatowns utilize their legacy of activism to produce meaningful change
that can help improve the community? Philadelphia’s Chinatown provides an interesting case study to see how
minority communities attempt to navigate the discourse of gentrification and urban spaces.
On the other hand, Washington D.C.’s Chinatown has been decimated by gentrification in the late 20th
century. According to Yanan Wang of the Washington Post, “The population of Chinese-Americans in
Chinatown has shrunk from a high of 3,000 to about 300 -- half of whom are now fighting to be able to stay.”93
D.C.’s Chinatown became a symbol of submission, agreed upon by Philadelphia Chinatown community
advocates such as Mary Yee from the Yellow Seeds who remarked “Had we not resisted what government
officials and politicians thought was inevitable at the outset, we would probably have suffered the sad fate of
Washington, DC's Chinatown, devastated by its convention center and the Verizon Center.”94 This case of a
fallen Chinatown offers insight on how Chinatowns oppose gentrification. Why did “Save Chinatown”
movements remain isolated in the past when they all faced the same issue of gentrification? Even if each
Chinatown had their own unique circumstances, why did they decide to go it alone against gentrification? The
urban renewal era of the late 20th century reinforced the notion that Chinatowns relied upon cultural tourism to
survive against urban renewal. In the 21st century, can Chinatowns move on from their historical reliance on
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cultural tourism and find other ways to thrive as a community? D.C.’s Chinatown provides a grim lesson to
minority communities divided on the issue of gentrification, that if they choose to support urban redevelopment,
they may find their voices lost in the dust of a construction site.
Chinatown neighborhoods in the United States were subjected to rigorous battles over the merits of
urban renewal. Whether it was through the fiery chants of “Save Chinatown!” that echoed throughout the streets
of Philadelphia or the extinguished flame of D.C.’s Chinatown neighborhood lost to gentrification, Chinatown
communities were instrumental in deciding the fate of their localities. Both Philadelphia and D.C. Chinatowns
experienced an influx in immigration and intra-community divisions that threatened their neighborhood’s
response to gentrification. Philadelphia’s immigration population in the suburbs jumped from 48-60% between
1980 and 2010.95 Yet, Philadelphia’s Chinatown protest movement empowered its residents to fight for their
right to stay in the city instead of fleeing to the suburbs, while D.C.’s Chinatown succumbed to internal
infighting and leadership who orchestrated the downfall of their neighborhood with urban planners. As stated by
the Yellow Seeds “The fate of Chinatown is now in your hands, the hands of the Chinese people. You, the
people of Chinatown, cannot continue to be apathetic. If you do not awaken now, you may soon find there is no
Chinatown left to fight for.”96 The cases of D.C. and Philadelphia Chinatowns reveal the importance of social
activism to combat gentrification and the complex relationships in minority communities that could hinder
attempts at social mobilization.
Future studies should consider how various minority communities can work together to combat urban
renewal. With more neighborhoods becoming integrated with a wide variety of peoples, how do diverse
communities bridge cultural divides to combat gentrification, and what prevented them from doing this in the
past? Chinatown’s experiences with gentrification reveal that minority communities can hold a variety of
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opinions on urban renewal that can affect how their communities respond to the phenomenon. In addition,
gentrification is a popular topic in the present day, and is widely agreed by scholars to be a major problem for
minorities neighborhoods. Cities all over the U.S. have drafted new comprehensive plans such as Philadelphia’s
2035 and D.C.’s 2006 plans to be more inclusive and truly improve the states of minority communities ravaged
by previous urban redevelopment projects. Gentrification must be studied further in order to analyze how
minority communities today navigate the phenomenon of gentrification and how they can reap the benefits of a
beautiful city in the 21st century.
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Frankenstein’s Creature: Monstrous Chicken or
Grotesque Egg? - Alexandria B. Acero, Gettysburg College
Mary Shelley’s life was saturated with feminist ideologies because of her upbringing and influence
from her father, William Godwin, and her mother, Mary Wollstonecraft. Shelley viewed the patriarchy negatively
because she was nurtured in an environment that criticized society. Shelley’s background influenced the themes
of womanhood and childbirth throughout Frankenstein. She used Victor Frankenstein to voice her criticisms
against society’s separated spheres of influence and the concept of “joyous” motherhood; her criticisms are
essential to understanding the argument over nature versus nurture. The argument consists of two sides: nature,
which believes that Victor's transgression on nature by forming the Creature is why he is malignant, and nurture,
which believes that the Creature becomes malicious due to Victor’s abandonment. Victor Frankenstein’s
transgression against nature is due to his sexist characterization that nature is feminine and passive. Victor’s views
on and transgressions against nature reflect how he treats women in the novel. His domination over nature is due
to his fear of feminine empowerment and sexuality, and this fear guides him to his formation and abandonment
of the Creature. The nature versus nurture argument should be intertwined to create a fuller understanding of the
underlying messages within the novel. Both Rahner and Mitchell believe Shelley’s life heavily influenced the
novel and although this aspect is greatly contested, Shelley's experiences with motherhood are essential to
understanding the topic of motherhood in Frankenstein.
During the time of Frankenstein’s production, new revelations came forth about Shelley’s family. First,
her half-sister, Fanny, came from an affair rather than Shelley’s established parents and committed suicide after
finding out of her illegitimacy. Second, Percy’s first wife drowned herself after realizing she was pregnant with
another man’s child. Third, her daughter, Clara, who was born from an affair between Shelley and Percy died
young. Last, her other daughter, Clara, was born after her first daughter’s death and around the time Frankenstein
was nearing its end (Rahner, 2-3). Shelley’s traumatic experiences possibly influenced the themes within
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Frankenstein, but due to societal expectations of women, proper female writers were expected to target female
audiences with education on proper behavior.
Shelley's experiences with separated gendered spheres influence the major themes of the novel. Her liberal
opinions stemmed from her family. Her mother was a feminist who wrote A Vindication of the Rights of Women,
and her father was a political philosopher and journalist (Rahner, 2). Mary Shelley, like her mother before her,
wrote about more masculine topics such as philosophy, science, and theology, which are meant to be taken with
authority. Because her topics were rooted in the intellectual sphere rather than the emotional sphere, to be taken
seriously and to avoid unnecessary sexist criticism, she published it anonymously. Through the assumed voice of
a man, Shelley was able to seriously critique the patriarchy, separated spheres of influence, and motherhood as
she experienced them without the public realizing the novel’s underlying themes. The unawareness caused thenpopular speculation that Percy was the true author, even when Shelley revealed herself. It was believed to be
impossible for a woman to create a work of literature so “masculine” (Rahner, 5-8). The spheres of influence in
the 19th century drew a harsh line between what was expected by men and what was expected by women, and
women who did not follow the social order were harassed, feared, and condemned.
These separate spheres of influence Shelley experienced reflect in Frankenstein because expectations for
women affect the characters and influence their actions. Women do not have the same freedoms their male
counterparts have within the story. They are restricted to the home; Caroline, Elizabeth, and Justine are placed in
occupations that fit the narrative that women are nurturing, loving animals. Their only purpose is to serve others,
especially their family and their children (Mellor, 3). They are caretakers, wives, or servants. The men are highly
aware of the restrictions they give women, as Alphonse tries to end Elizabeth’s rebuttals on her little brother’s
occupation. He suggests that she “ought to be an advocate” (Shelley, 41). This jab is supposed to remind Elizabeth
that her gender restrains her to the home rather than intellectual public spaces, and characterizes women as
unintelligent because of their caring nature. Caroline Beaufort even dies because of her desire to nurture a sick
Elizabeth back to health. Her death seems frivolous and nonsensical. She could no longer “debar herself from
her society… and the consequences of this impudence were fatal” (Shelley, 25). Victor believes that care and
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nurture have no place in his societal sphere, he even considers Caroline’s care to be brazen. His disdain shows
the negative connotation of nurture within Victor’s masculine, intellectual sphere. Too much compassion would
lead to one’s downfall. Just like Caroline, Elizabeth’s emotions are irrational. She is unintelligent and undeserving
of masculine privileges because of her feminine characteristics. When Victor and Henry Clerval are about to
leave, she “wept” and wished Victor to be “happy and tranquil” when he comes back (Shelley, 110). Elizabeth
also mentions that she had the chance to “[enlarge] her experience” and “[cultivate] her understanding,”
suggesting that she is unable to go with her fiancé because of societal constraints (Shelley, 110). In this scene,
Victor is intentionally framing her to be undeserving of opportunity because of her empathetic nature. Yet, when
Henry is given feminine traits, like nursing Victor back to health, Victor sees him as his “friend and dearest
companion” (Shelley, 115). Women are restrained due to their gender, while men are able to freely express
themselves.
Victor's fears of female sexuality and empowerment come to a climax during his destruction of the female
Creature. He expects women to be submissive but believes that without society, the female Creature
“might become ten thousand times more malignant than her mate and delight, for its own sake, in murder and
wretchedness. He had sworn to quit the neighbourhood of man and hide himself in deserts, but she had not….
who in all probability was to become a thinking and reasoning animal, might refuse to comply with a compact
made before her creation. They might even hate each other… She also might turn with disgust from him to the
superior beauty of man… and he be again alone, exasperated by the fresh provocation of being deserted by one
of his own species… one of the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon thirsted would be children,
and a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth…” (Shelley, 118-119).

Victor believes that even without society’s restraints, the female Creature would keep the personality of a
“woman.” She would be too emotional to think as coherently, like his first Creature, and murder those around
her. Victor fears the female Creature’s freedom of choice, a right that women do not have in his society. The
female Creature would not be a servant or caretaker to the Creature, and she would not be easily dominated. She
does not expect her counterpart to control her, as Victor does to all the other women he knows. He is, lastly,
concerned about her sexuality: if left alone, she would be able to reproduce with his Creature without his control.
Her freedom and strength subvert patriarchal expectations, and therefore she would be the “enemy of values”
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(JanMohamed quotes in Mitchell, 40). Victor’s abortion of the female Creature shows an insecure need for male
dominance stemming from his fear of feminine power.
Victor’s relationship with Henry Clerval enforces Victor's fear of a woman’s bodily autonomy, rather than
femininity itself. Henry’s feminine interests allow him to be seen as Victor’s “beloved friend” (Shelley, 111).
Victor’s affection for Henry is similar to a young schoolgirl in love. He describes in detail the eyes of his friend;
they are “the dark orbs covered by the lids, and the long black lashes that fringed them” (Shelley, 131). His
relationship with Henry is romantic and his friendship with him allows Victor to be “the same happy creature
who, a few years ago, loving and beloved by all, had no sorrow or care” (Shelley, 45). Overall, Victor finds Henry
to be his physical and mental equal and his “soul mate” (Mellor, 12). When his “dearest Henry” dies, Victor’s
“human frame could no longer support the agonizing suffering that” he endured, and “a fever succeeded” his
angst (Shelley, 127). Victor wishes that he died instead of Henry, as he is now “more miserable than man ever
was before” (Shelley, 127). His love for Henry is consistent. Before and after Henry’s death, Victor praises him
for being a wonderful friend and has the strongest emotional reactions to Henry’s presence. Victor’s fear of female
empowerment and sexuality disallows him to create deep relationships with the surrounding women, only when
they are of the same gender is when any lasting sentiments are formed.
Victor’s friendship with Henry is more caring and emotional than his relationship with his lover, Elizabeth.
He finds Elizabeth to be his “favorite animal” and “a possession of [his] own” (Shelley, 20). He sees her as an
object to “tend” to and look down upon, rather than a human being with similar intelligence and interests (Shelley,
20). Elizabeth’s death is, also, less heartbreaking. When he “saw her, lifeless and inanimate, thrown across the
bed, her head hanging down, and her pale and distorted features half covered by her hair,” he rushes to embrace
“her with ardour; but the deathly languor and coldness of the limbs told me, that what I now held in my arms had
ceased to be the Elizabeth whom I had loved and cherished” and hang “over her in the agony of despair” after he
woke up from his faint (Shelley, 140-141). Victor’s description of her body is similar to a description of a woman
right after sex: haphazardly on the bed with messy hair. It is only when Victor realizes that she is nothing but a
dead body that he can look at her sexually. Not once has he described any action with Elizabeth as enthusiastic
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or passionate previous to her death. Before the wedding, Elizabeth even questions whether he loves her at all.
Moments earlier to her death, he “earnestly entreated her to retire.” (Shelly, 140). Victor fears Elizabeth’s
sexuality that he refuses to go into the bedroom with her during their honeymoon, and causes her death. If Victor
were to consummate their marriage, he would lose his domination over Elizabeth, because her uninhibited
sexuality would threaten the construct of masculine authority. Rather than showing Elizabeth romantic and sexual
desire, her sexuality and her ability to reproduce are violently destroyed within the bedroom, a stereotypical place
of consummation, so that he could protect his dominant role. The juxtaposition of Victor’s relationship with Henry
and his relationship with Elizabeth shows Victor’s inability to earnestly love a sexually liberated woman.
Victor’s construction of the Creature, which is a transgression against Nature, is due to his nature: his fear
of female empowerment and sexuality. Victor is the mouthpiece of sexist scientific beliefs, and his transgression
is a cautionary tale not to go against the will of nature. He feminizes nature as he chases “nature to her hidingplaces'' (Shelley, 35). Victor’s conviction that women are passive and docile is applied to the natural world.
Because of this assumption, Victor removes all womanly attributes during his formation of the Creature. When
Victor goes to a churchyard, a place merely a “receptacle of bodies deprived of life” and “beheld the corruption
of death succeed to the blooming cheek of life,” he removes the societal importance of women because he is
recreating life through reanimating body parts rather than pregnancy (Shelley, 33). Victor’s fear leads him to go
against nature and removes the female body during procreation.
Nature rebukes Victor’s narrative and seeks revenge. During Victor’s unnatural pregnancy, he experiences
mood swings, his “enthusiasm was checked by [his] anxiety,” while “[his] person became emancipated” and
“oppressed by a strong fever… [his] cheeks turned pale” (Shelley, 33-35). Victor’s ailments are caused by Nature.
Through her, Victor is forced to experience birth’s downfalls, and she decides that an “unnatural method of
reproduction” should produce “an unnatural being” (Mellor, 11). Victor’s newly-formed child has a “shriveled
complexion and straight black lips” (Shelley, 35). Victor’s need to control the female body is given consequences
as he and his child experience Nature’s punishment.
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The Creature becomes a woman-murdering monster because of Victor’s nature. The Creature influences
Justine’s and causes Elizabeth’s deaths. Justine, William Frankenstein’s caretaker, is framed by the Creature and
killed for the murder of William, while Elizabeth is killed by him on her honeymoon. The Creature removes all
the leftover maternal figures within the novel and removes Victor’s ability to naturally procreate. The Creature is
used as a subconscious tool for Victor to remove his fears of female empowerment and sexuality.
Because Victor uses his Creature as a weapon against the natural maternal figures, he becomes the only
maternal figure. This causes tension between Victor and his Creature, as Victor must act in a way he believes is
below him. To fully nurture a new species of human, Victor “must be emasculated and transform himself as a
woman” (Freud quoted in Mitchell, 40). This is problematic for Victor, as his ideologies and fears are ingrained
within the separated social spheres. The “blurring of gender” would force Victor to be both within the superior
masculine, intelligent sphere, and the inferior feminine, emotional sphere (Mitchell, 40). Even though Victor
strives to birth a new species of human, the fear created by his machismo ideologies prevents him from being
“emasculated” (being affectionate and loving to his Creature) and taking the social role of motherhood.
Frankenstein critiques birth, conception, death, and the realities of postpartum trauma. The novel
represents Shelley’s experiences with motherhood. Rather than showcasing birth as a wonderful time filled with
love and excitement for a new life, the conception of the Creature is physically and mentally draining on Victor,
and intertwined with death. When Victor finishes the Creature, he was already “oppressed by a strong fever” and
“emancipated” (Shelley, 33-35). Victor’s state during his pregnancy reveals the realities of child-rearing. Rather
than exciting and beautiful, it is exhausting and leaves one feeling empty. Like Victor, all of a pregnant woman’s
energy, thoughts, time, and nutrients go to the growing child rather than to herself. When his Creature is finally
brought to life, he is overpowered by negative emotions and immediately rejects his child. This is evidence of
postpartum trauma, as new mothers commonly have depression and anxiety after giving birth (Rahner, 9). Shelly’s
trauma is evident from the Creature’s conception from the bodies in the graveyard (Shelley, 33-35). Her second
daughter, Clara, was named after the first after Clara died (Rahner, 2). The Creature’s birth combines life and
death, similar to how the second Clara’s life is formed and intentionally made to be a continuation of her first late
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daughter’s life. The Creature’s birth is also correlated to her mother’s death caused by Shelley’s birth. Since
Shelley experienced deaths caused by the creation of new life, the Creature is intentionally made to be malignant.
He represents the unfortunate circumstances of Shelley’s motherhood and the realities of child-rearing during the
19th-century.
Victor rejecting his Creature is a subversion and critique of the doting, loving mother. During Victor’s
creation period, he is meticulous about which body parts are selected to make his Creature. He recalls making
sure that each part of him is attractive during the assemblage. When the Creature is finally brought to life, he is
refused love and rejected by Victor because of his ugly appearance. This is similar to how new young mothers
react to their child: threatened. The Creature’s appearance is a physical representation of Victor’s perception of
him after his rejection. The act of rejecting the child represents postnatal trauma. Victor does not even know the
creation and yet, like all new mothers, is forced to take care and nurture the child. His trauma forbids Victor to
nurture his child, which causes the Creature’s future revenge. It is ironic that Victor agrees to create another
Creature but violently destroys it. His agreement to force his Creature to leave him alone, “a subversion of the
typical ‘family romance,’” where the mother wants to prevent her child from leaving (Mitchell, 42). Yet, the
second Creature’s destruction is Victor's unwillingness to separate from his child, like his mother was separated
from him. Like a mother, Victor is ashamed that he could not control his child’s actions, but trying to do so is
impossible because the Creature is “‘not in communication’” (Mitchell, 42). Even though the Creature can speak
and communicate through words, he and Victor cannot communicate their wants or emotions with each other
because of Victor’s disgust. Victor’s lack of control reflects Shelley’s shame of her lack of control over her
children and their tragic deaths. Victor’s rejection of his Creature doubles as Shelley’s critique of societal
expectations on motherhood, as it shows that not all maternal experiences are full of whimsy and excitement.
The Creature becomes a malicious monster because of Victor’s lack of compassion and rejection of his
creation. This is shown through the Creature’s desire to have a similar life to the De Lacey family. Even though
the De Laceys do not have much in terms of money or food. Their relationship with each other and Safie shows
the Creature that he could be loved and nurtured. When the Creature is ultimately rejected, he becomes angry
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because none of the people he cares about are willing to care for him. The Creature’s last desperate plea for love
and attention comes in the terms of another Creature. He “demand[s] a creature of another sex… [they] shall be
monsters, cut off from all of the world” (Shelley, 102). The Creature’s only asked to be loved. He wants someone
similar to him because it is the only way they could be equals and that he would not be rejected again. When
Victor destroyed his female creation, this told the Creature that Victor believes that his child does not deserve
love. This last transgression against the Creature forces him to torture Victor. If he cannot nurture and love, then
he should not be given love either. The Creature ends Victor’s life to get rid of any compassion his creator
receives. Victor’s elimination of the maternal figures causes his downfall as he is unwilling to love the Creature
and the Creature seeks revenge.
Victor’s fears of female empowerment and sexuality arise from his suppressive and divided society. His
fear caused him to refuse to nurture the Creature because nurturing him would force Victor to align with the
seemingly lesser feminine sphere. His fear becomes his nature, which transmutes into the Creature’s nature.
Victor’s nature influences how he nurtures the Creature. Due to Victor’s nature, he trains the Creature to eliminate
all of Victor’s natural maternal rivals through not nurturing the Creature at all. Victor’s fear is a critique of the
separate spheres within 19th-century society. It stems from the expectation that women should be submissive,
emotional, and inferior to men. Such fear affects the relationship between Victor and the Creature. This
relationship is a critique of motherhood during the 19th-century. Victor does not nurture the Creature and his
emotions about his child is an inverse of the expectation of motherhood. Victor’s fears stemming from his
patriarchal expectations critique 19th-century expectations of women and the believed consensus on what
motherhood is like.
The nature argument believes that the Creature was born malignant because his formation broke the laws
of nature. The nurture argument believes that Victor’s lack of compassion for the Creature causes him to become
malignant. Neither side takes into account the beliefs and fears of Victor. Victor’s nature is important to
understand the Creature’s nature, as his beliefs and fears influence not only how he would react to the Creature
but how the Creature is made. Mary Shelley’s life influencing the themes of the novel dictates how Victor acts
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and what he is afraid of. Victor’s nature is an important influence on nature and nurture because the book is
focused more on his life rather than the Creature’s.
Frankenstein shows that it is not nature versus nurture, but nature and nurture. Victor deciding to
transgress against nature and build a creature out of dead body parts is due to his fear of female empowerment
and sexuality. His fears affect the way he nurtures the Creature. Victor’s nature becomes the Creature’s nature
because he is single-handedly creating his child. Because Victor’s society influences his nature, it influences the
Creature's nature, which influences Victor’s nurture. Both sides of the argument are lacking, as nature and nurture
are cyclical. Nature and nurture are not against each other, rather, they have tension. Nature and nurture are
seemingly at opposing ends but impact each other.
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Unprecedented Success: How the Alternative for
Germany Party Capitalized on Eastern German
Economic Grievance and Euroscepticism in 2013 and
2014 - Aidan J. Schwob, Villanova University
Introduction
The right-wing Alternative for Germany party, referred to as the “AfD” after its German spelling,
Alternative für Deutschland, was Germany’s largest opposition party from 2013 until 2021, when Olaf Scholz
and the Social Democratic Party defeated retiring Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Union alliance in the federal
election, relegating the Union to opposition status (Goldenberg, 2021). In the 2021 election, the AfD lost 11
seats in the Bundestag, leaving the party with 10.87% of representation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2022). The AfD
initially rose to popularity in 2013 when it garnered 4.7% of the federal vote, missing the threshold for the
Bundestag by only 0.3%, and in 2014 when it entered the European Parliament backed by 7% of the German
vote (Grimm, 2015). When the AfD was voted into the Bundestag with 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 election,
it became the first party to the right of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to gain federal representation
since the parliament of Western Germany was established in 1949 (Eddy and Erlanger, 2017). Much attention
has been directed to the causes of the AfD’s surprising success in breaking the German postwar taboo against
far-right populism. In this paper, I argue that the Alternative for Germany party gained popularity during 2013
and 2014 by capitalizing on the euroscepticism in eastern Germany that arose from the eastern region’s aging
population facing a struggling economy and experiencing economic grievance in the wake of the eurozone debt
crisis. This paper considers the rise of the AfD to have taken place between April 2013 and September 2014, the
18-month period during which the AfD evolved from being a nascent party to earning 4.7% of votes in the
federal election, 7% of German votes in the European Parliament election, and 10% of seats in three different
2014 German state elections (Deutsche Welle, 2014A; Deutsche Welle, 2014B; BBC, 2014).

Origins of the AfD
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The AfD originated in 2013 when Bernd Lucke catapulted the party into the German spotlight by
delivering a fervent speech to a crowd of 1,300 people in Berlin (Scholz, 2013). Lucke, a professor of
macroeconomics at Hamburg University, co-founded the party with Alexander Gauland, Konrad Adam, and
Gerd Robanus, all former members of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU (Lachmann, 2013; Arzheimer, 2015).
When it was introduced in 2013, the AfD was a single-issue party advocating for the abolition of the euro and
the restoration of the deutschmark (Grimm, 2015). In response to Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to bailouts
of Greece, which reflected her unconditional support for the joint currency, the leaders of the AfD presented
their party as a rare political alternative in Germany (Lachmann, 2013).
The AfD’s resentment towards the eurozone was driven by the party’s belief that regulation of the single
currency had dissolved. Specifically, the AfD lamented violations of the Stability and Growth Pact, a eurozone
founding document that reinforces the convergence criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty (Arzheimer,
2015). Neither Germany nor France was held accountable for violating these requirements by running budget
deficits greater than 3% of their gross domestic products in the early 21st century. In addition to complaining
about the dissolution of fiscal regulation, the AfD argued that the Maastricht Treaty outlawed bailouts between
European Union member states. According to AfD leaders, the Maastricht Treaty’s “No Bail-Out Clause”
mandated that national governments were solely responsible for budget discipline and repaying public debt,
meaning that eurozone bailouts of indebted countries violated the regulations of European integration
(Arzheimer, 2015). Further, the AfD fervently contended that the European Central Bank’s fiscal and monetary
actions in response to the eurozone debt crisis, most notably the purchasing of Greek and Italian bonds, violated
the regulations of the single currency.
Only five months after its inception, the AfD narrowly missed the threshold to enter the Bundestag
(Berbuir, Lewandosky, and Siri, 2014). It went on to win seven seats in the European Parliament in the spring
2014 election. During the German state elections the following September, the AfD won 12.2% of the vote in
Brandenburg, 10.6% in Thuringia, and 9.7% in Saxony. All three of these federal states, along with the future
strongholds of the AfD as seen in Figure 1, are located in the eastern region of Germany, the former Soviet-
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controlled German Democratic Republic (Buck, 2017). The AfD’s rapid rise to popularity in the eastern region,
which is unprecedented in postwar German politics, can be attributed to an aging eastern population, a
struggling eastern economy, and economic grievance following the eurozone debt crisis at the turn of the 21st
century’s first decade.

Figure 1: 2017 AfD support map (Buck, 2017)

Factor I: Aging eastern German population
A primary cause for the AfD’s rise to popularity in eastern Germany is the eastern region’s aging
population. The federal states that comprise the former East Germany have a shockingly different age
distribution than the states in western Germany (Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019). German district age
densities, shown in Figure 2, reveal that the eastern German regions have staggeringly few citizens aged 18-29.
While Berlin’s suburbs attract more people aged 30-49 to certain parts of eastern Germany, the region still lacks
a robust middle-aged population. Eastern Germany is home to a disproportionately large number of citizens
aged 50-64, with nearly every eastern German district containing a higher density of these older working-age
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people than nearly every district in western Germany. German citizens older than 65 are predominantly
concentrated in the rural portions of eastern Germany.

Figure 2: German age distribution by district
(Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019)

The primary cause and consequence of the aging population in eastern Germany is internal migration to
western Germany, especially by young citizens (Klüsener and Goldstein, 2016). As seen in Figure 3, which
shows the migration balance of east-west migration in Germany between 1995 and 2006, eastern states
consistently lost citizens to western states (Glorius, 2010). This is also a self-reinforcing cycle. A region with an
aging population becomes less attractive to young citizens, further driving out more young people. Figure 4,
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cumulative migration totals between 2008 and 2014, shows the continuity of these migration trends. The many
dark red regions (highest net losses) in rural German areas indicate that young citizens cluster in urban areas,
often being attracted away from rural regions (Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019). This is primarily because
education and subsequent labor market entry drives migration decisions for young populations (Schneider,
2005; Sunder, Trocka and Günther, 2008).

Figure 3: Internal migration balance of east-west migration in
Germany (Glorius, 2010)
Figure 4: Net migration as a
percentage of population, 19952010 (Bauer, Rulff, and
Tamminga, 2019)

Eastern Germany’s internal migration losses create a problematic shrinking of the workforce population
(Brautzsch et al., 2014). As shown in Figure 5, the east German labor force potential decreased 21% (2.3
million) between 1991 and 2013 (Brautzsch, 2014). Contrarily, the west German labor force increased by 6%
(2.5 million) over the same period. This loss in working population resulted in increased job vacancies,
especially for small enterprises seeking skilled workers. Of the 77 districts in eastern Germany, 41 are projected
to lose at least 30% of their working-age population by 2035 (Buck, 2019). In addition to slowing economic
growth, the aging population in eastern Germany is also more susceptible to populism and nativism. Pesthy,
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Mader, and Schoen identify that many older east German citizens were politically socialized during German
separation and therefore more inclined to far-right politics (Pesthy, Mader, and Schoen, 2020). Because of this,
a proportional increase in these conservative aging eastern Germans citizens resulted in a higher percentage of
votes for the far-right AfD. This is one explanation for why the shaded regions in Figure 1 are almost identical
to panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.

Figure 5: Labor Force Potential (Brautzsch, 2014)

Factor II: Deficient eastern German economy
Another factor that explains the rise of the AfD in eastern Germany is the eastern region’s inferior
economy compared to the west’s (Deutsche Welle, 2019; The Economist, 2014). As seen in Figure 6,
productivity is far lower in the east, with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of eastern Germany equaling
only 70% of the GDP per capita in western Germany (Buck, 2017; Blum, 2019). Per-capita GDP in eastern
Germany converged on western per-capita GDP in the years following reunification, but this convergence
stagnated as both regions experienced similar growth levels starting in 1995 (The Economist, 2014). As seen in
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Figures 6, 7, and 8, the federal states that make up the former German Democratic Republic (the five light bars
on the chart in Figure 6, the white districts in Figure 7, and the lightly shaded curve that starts in 1990 in Figure
8), have had the lowest per-capita GDPs in Germany from reunification through the 2010s, showing the
economic inequality between the two regions leading up to AfD’s rise to popularity (Buck, 2017; The World
Bank, 2013; Blum, 2019).

Figure 6: 2015 Per-Capita GDP of the Federal States of Germany (Buck, 2017)

The structural economic problems in eastern Germany, which have been compounded by the region’s
aging population, can be attributed to the privatization of former state-owned companies in the German
Democratic Republic. Upon reunification, the Treuhand privatization agency hastily sold former East German
state-held companies to the private sector to be integrated into the unified German market (Krueger and
Pischke, 1992). However, many of these companies collapsed because they could not compete within the new
German monetary union that set the values of the East and West German currencies equal even though the
West’s was four times as valuable (Beard, 2019). Because of the monetary union, the newly integrated eastern
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German region could not benefit from a weak exchange rate or low wages to improve its competitiveness, and
the products of eastern German firms became instantly overpriced. This cratered the eastern German economy
and triggered a rapid capital flight out of the east and massive job loss (Giebler and Wyrwich 2018).
Consequently, eastern Germany deindustrialized as employment in mining and manufacturing fell to 25% of its
pre-unification level (Carlin and Mayer, 1992).

Figure 7: Per-capita GDP by
German district, 2013 (The
World Bank, 2013)

Figure 8: Per-Capita GDP of east and west Germany over
time (Blum, 2019)

This “cold start” for the eastern German economy, with failed privatization leading to deindustrialization
and low investment, left deep scars in the region’s economy (Burda 2013; Deutsche Welle, 2015). In the 21st
century, the eastern regions of Germany still experience persistently higher unemployment and lower wages
than western Germany (Gramlich, 2019). As seen in Figure 9, eastern Germany had perpetually higher
unemployment and underemployment than western Germany between 1991 and 2013. While the gaps between
the two regions have shrunk for both measures, eastern Germany had totals around 4% higher for both
unemployment and underemployment at the time of the AfD’s founding in 2013. In addition to facing higher
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unemployment, the east German labor force also earns lower wages while working longer hours (Deutsche
Welle, 2018).

Figure 9: Unemployment and underemployment in eastern and western Germany
(Brautzsch, 2014)

Another lingering consequence of unsuccessful reunification is the dearth of company headquarters in
Germany’s eastern states (Blum, 2019). Figure 10 shows the imbalance in headquarter location for the top 500
companies in Germany (Bölinger, 2014). In 2013, when the AfD was established and began its rise to
popularity, eastern German states (excluding the German capital city of Berlin) were home to 14 of the 500, or
2.6%, of top companies. Between 2003, when it hosted nine of the top 500 firms, and 2013, eastern Germany
experienced a mere 1% increase in top company headquarters. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 11, not a single
company listed on the DAX Performance Index – the blue-chip stock market index comprised of the 30 top
German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange – has its headquarters in eastern Germany
(Deutsche Welle, 2019).
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Figure 10: Regional headquarter distribution of top 500 German companies
(Heimpold, 2014)

Not only does eastern Germany lack headquarters of top German companies, but firms located in the
east on average are smaller than in western states. This is another reverberation of the Treuhand’s swift
privatization. Because large firms in the German Democratic Republic could not be easily sold by the Treuhand,
many were partitioned into smaller firms that were more palatable to investors (Deutsche Welle, 2010A). The
results of this can be seen in Figure 12, showing 2012 state-level data of the average turnover per unit liable to
turnover tax (Heimpold, 2014). As Figure 12 shows, the average firm size in eastern German states is only half
of the average firm size in western German states. This small average firm size, combined with a lack of
company headquarters, resulted in low research and development investment and inferior productivity in eastern
Germany. These deficiencies, exacerbated by the economically problematic aging east German population,
significantly hindered the region’s innovation potential (Gregory and Patuelli, 2015). The combination of these
economic factors with the conservative nature of the aging population of eastern Germany fostered contempt for
the federal government and engendered the ideal atmosphere for the anti-euro AfD to carve its place in German
politics.
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Figure 11: Distribution of Listed Companies (Bölinger, 2014)

Factor III: Economic grievance after the eurozone debt crisis
Economic grievance after the eurozone debt crisis created the euroscepticism that the AfD needed to
attract eastern German support. As citizens of a region with an aging population and a deficient economy, east
Germans felt indignant towards Berlin and the Bundestag at the start of the 2010s. These trends began with
reunification in 1990 and continued throughout the 2000s, but when they were compounded by economic
grievance in the wake of the eurozone debt crisis, they produced the anti-euro sentiment on which the AfD
capitalized to rise to popularity. In March of 2010, Angela Merkel and the German Parliament approved a 22.4billion-euro bailout of Greece (Smale, 2015). Merkel justified the expensive taxpayer-funded foreign bailout
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package by claiming that Germany had no alternative but to support the euro (Deutsche Welle, 2010B). This
attitude was reflected in Parliament, as all parties in the Bundestag except the Left Party maintained support for
the euro and acknowledged the necessity of helping indebted eurozone countries (Kietz, 2013). In response to
this, eastern German citizens became frustrated that the federal government acknowledged the direness of the
European debt situation while neglecting domestic economic inequalities.

Figure 12: 2012 German firm size by state (Heimpold, 2014)

The AfD seized support from these disenchanted eastern Germans by directly countering Merkel’s
positions and criticizing her political actions. Lucke, the AfD leader, claimed that the eurozone debt crisis was
“the hour for political opposition” (Grimm, 2015). Further, he asserted that the AfD would “put an end to the
flagrant breach of democratic, legal and economic principles that we have seen in the past three years because
Chancellor Merkel’s government said there is no alternative... Now it is here, the Alternative for Germany”
(Eddy and Kulish, 2013). This message resonated with struggling eastern Germans, who, suffering from
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structural economic inequalities, did not support channeling resources to save the euro and instead believed that
the Bundestag should direct financial relief to eastern Germany.
By taking a stance against Merkel and the euro, the AfD was able to seize a small but still significant
portion of the German vote. Figure 13 shows the impact that a German voter’s opposition to international
financial bailouts had on his or her probability to vote for the AfD in the 2013 federal elections (Mader and
Schoen, 2016). The upward slopes of the curves demonstrate that increased opposition to Germany’s foreign
bailouts made a voter much more likely to vote for the AfD. The authors find that this relationship was not
present for other German parties. This finding demonstrates that economic discontent was the dominant cause
for AfD support in 2013. That opposition against taxpayer-funded bailouts was a vote driver for only the AfD
shows that economic grievance, which was experienced primarily by Germans in eastern regions with aging
populations and flawed economies, was the primary cause of the rise of the AfD in 2013 and 2014.

Figure 13: Impact of opposition to bailouts on probability to vote for the AfD, 2013
(Mader and Schoen, 2016)
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The upward slope on the curve in Figure 14, which charts the correlation between ethnocentrism and
opposition to bailouts, suggests that AfD voters who were opposed to the bailouts also had ethnocentric
attitudes (Mader and Schoen, 2016). This seems to imply that a cultural backlash argument can also explain the
rise of the AfD (Norris and Inglehart, 2016). Indeed, conservative AfD supporters likely harbored attitudes of
cultural backlash. However, the AfD at this time was a single-issue party advocating for the abolition of the
euro, meaning that economic grievance is the single best explanation of the party’s rise in 2013 and 2014.

Figure 14: Correlation of ethnocentrism and opposition to bailouts
(Mader and Schoen, 2016)

Conclusion
This paper has described the three primary causes behind the rise of the Alternative for Germany party
in the country’s eastern regions: eastern Germany’s aging population, its deficient economy, and the economic
grievance of its citizens after the eurozone debt crisis. The implications of these findings are significant because
the factors that allowed the AfD to gain representation at the state, federal, and European levels were not
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temporary. In fact, the contrary is true. Figure 15 shows that Germany’s population will continue to age, while
Figure 16 shows that the gap between the eastern and western German economies will continue to widen (FP
Analytics, 2019; Irrek, 2014). These projections, taken in tandem with this paper’s findings, indicate that the
AfD itself is not a temporary phenomenon. Instead, it will continue to influence German and European politics.
The findings of this paper are especially relevant to Germany’s political landscape as it emerges from the
COVID-19 pandemic and the corresponding worldwide financial crisis. Support for the AfD waned during the
pandemic as Angela Merkel and the Union combatted the virus, but a social and economic environment similar
to the one that originally fostered support for the AfD may arise in post-pandemic Germany (Schütz, 2020). As
the economic weaknesses of Germany’s eastern regions are further exposed, economic marginalization and
economic grievance will accelerate. If the ruling coalition does not acknowledge the worsening demographic
and labor force deficiencies of eastern German states and pledge financial resources to ameliorate the east’s
growing economic marginalization, the far-right party will continue to infiltrate the Bundestag and undermine
support for the coalition’s agenda.
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Figure 15: German population age projections (FP Analytics, 2019)

Figure 16: Projection of eastern and western German GDP per capita (Irrek, 2014)
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The Relationship Between Perceived Stress and
Disordered Eating in Undergraduate Students During
the COVID-19 Pandemic - Caroline G. Martin, Franklin & Marshall
College
Disordered Eating
Surveys estimate that 75% of American women engage in disordered eating behaviors (Science Daily,
2008). These abnormal eating behaviors include food restriction, binge eating, eating to fulfill emotional needs,
and compensatory behaviors, such as spitting, purging, and exercise abuse (Ozier & Henry, 2011). Numerous
health-related consequences, such as poor self-rated health, psychological distress, and higher BMI’s, are
associated with disordered eating (Kärkkäinen et al., 2018). Additionally, previous research conducted by Gan et
al. (2011) suggested a relationship between disordered eating, stress, depression, and anxiety, demonstrating
negative mental health associations as well.
Disordered eating is also a significant issue that many college students face. A longitudinal study
conducted over thirteen years found an 18% increase in disordered eating and a 12% increase in eating disorder
diagnoses among college students (White et al., 2011). Additionally, Striegel-Moore et al. (1989) determined that
25% of college students began dieting, and 15% began binge eating in their first year of college. Furthermore,
researchers have discussed various factors related to this increase in disordered eating behaviors, including high
perceived stress and negative perceptions about their weight. This increase in the prevalence of disordered eating
behaviors is concerning as it could contribute to serious issues, such as eating disorders (Blodgett Salafia et al.,
2012).
Although there are various connections, disordered eating behaviors are distinct and different from eating
disorders. Disordered eating encompasses a wide variety of abnormal eating behaviors (Ozier & Henry, 2011),
whereas eating disorders are severe and clinically diagnosable mental illnesses by the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Concerning college students, eating disorders are, unfortunately, significant
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issues. Using a random sample of college students, research conducted by Eisenberg et al. (2011) found that
approximately 9% to 13% of college women meet the diagnostic criteria for an eating disorder, while 3% to 4%
of men also meet the criteria. This is worrisome as Eisenberg et al. (2011) also indicated a low treatment-seeking
rate among college students, signifying that college students typically only receive treatment when they are in
crisis.
Today, college students face another challenge- studying during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
Although COVID-19 is ongoing, one pilot study suggested that the pandemic has increased disordered eating
behaviors by 38% (Fernández-Aranda et al., 2020). Researchers have proposed three potential pathways in which
the COVID-19 pandemic may increase disordered eating, including disruptions to daily activities, media use, and
emotional distress (Rodgers et al., 2020).
Specific to college students, studies have also shown an increase in disordered eating during the COVID19 pandemic (Keel et al., 2020; Flaudias et al., 2020). One study examined perceived weight versus actual weight
gain as a result of the COVID-19 quarantine and found that perceived weight gain was higher than actual weight
gain for over a quarter of college students (Keel et al., 2020). Therefore, the pandemic appears to have affected
students’ perceptions of their weight, which may eventually contribute to disordered eating behavior.
Additionally, another study took notice of the increased use of social media during lockdown periods and
determined that increased exposure to media containing COVID-19 information was significantly associated with
the desire to binge eat (Flaudias et al., 2020). Thus, COVID-19 has various implications for disordered eating.
Stress
Stress is a universal mental state that everyone endures, and while some amount of stress is necessary and
promotes improved brain performance (Kirby et al., 2013), chronic stress has numerous negative effects on one’s
health and body, including reproductive issues, cardiovascular problems, and a weakened immune system, among
others (American Psychological Association, 2018). However, stress also has mental health implications, in which
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research has demonstrated correlations between stress, depression, and anxiety (Gan et al., 2011; Husky et al.,
2020).
For college students, stress is unavoidable. College students’ stressors typically fall into five different
dimensions: personal inadequacy, fear of failure, interpersonal difficulties, teacher-pupil relationships, and
inadequate study facilities (Reddy et al., 2018). Among current and recent college students, researchers indicated
that the most significant source of stress came from their studies (Ramachandiran & Dhanapal, 2018).
Furthermore, academic stress is often correlated with maladaptive coping behaviors such as alcohol use (Metzger
et al., 2017) and binge eating (Martyn-Nemeth et al., 2009). This is concerning as it demonstrates the need for
resources to promote healthy coping strategies for college students.
Each year, the American Psychological Association (APA) conducts the Stress in America Survey. Given
the recent context, it is no surprise that the APA’s 2021 edition focused solely on the COVID-19 pandemic.
Findings from the APA’s survey noted that 75% of adults reported a high stress level (a score between eight and
10 on a 10-item Likert scale where 10 represented “a great deal of stress”) when asked about the COVID-19
pandemic (2021). In addition, Shah et al. (2021) suggested that the longer a person remained in quarantine, the
more stress the person experienced. Considering that COVID-19 has claimed over 500,000 lives in the United
States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2021), it is no surprise that the pandemic is a substantial
stressor for many. These increased stress levels are not unique to Americans, as regardless of location, stress and
anxiety related to COVID-19 across the globe are profoundly prevalent (Shah et al., 2021).
Unfortunately, college students, who already have high levels of stress, are accumulating even more
during this pandemic (Charles et al., 2021). Toward the beginning of COVID-19, some students relocated to
quarantine with family members, friends, or significant others, and researchers found that college students who
relocated to quarantine with their parents had lower levels of stress compared to those who did not relocate (Husky
et al., 2020). Furthermore, as classes moved online to prevent COVID-19 transmission, a study conducted by
Moawad (2020) determined that online learning is associated with significant stress levels, with the strongest
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stressor being the uncertainty of completing final exams and projects entirely online. Similarly, one study
suggested that college students’ perceived stress levels are approximately 3% higher now than they were prior to
the pandemic’s onset (Charles et al., 2021).
Disordered Eating and Stress
Ultimately, multiple studies have demonstrated a unique relationship between stress and disordered eating
(Blodgett Salafia & Lerner, 2012; Gan et al., 2011; King et al., 2009). For example, previous research found that
females have higher reported rates of stress and disordered eating behaviors compared to males, even among
middle school children (Blodgett Salafia & Lerner, 2012). This association between disordered eating and stress,
specifically job-related stress, was also found in nurses (King et al., 2009).
College students endure various sources of stress, and research has indicated that students with high levels
of stress presented more unhealthy dietary behaviors, including undereating and overeating, compared to students
with lower stress levels (Oliver & Wardle, 1999; Choi, 2020). Additionally, Gan et al. (2011) found a significant
moderate correlation between disordered eating and stress regardless of sex. Breaking it down by sources of stress,
one study suggested that when students had higher academic stress, they also reported significantly higher levels
of disordered eating (Costarelli & Patsai, 2012). Therefore, even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, various
associations between stress and disordered eating were found in college students. Nevertheless, one study did
examine college students amidst COVID-19 and determined that higher stress levels during quarantine periods
were related to an increased risk of disordered eating behaviors (Flaudias et al., 2020).
Current Research
As mentioned above, previous studies have found a relationship between increased stress levels and
COVID-19 among undergraduate students (Park et al., 2020; Shah et al., 2021). Additionally, recent research has
also demonstrated increased disordered eating behaviors during COVID-19 (Keel et al., 2020; Flaudias et al.,
2020). As the pandemic continues, it is imperative to understand how COVID-19 is affecting different aspects of
students’ lives. In a non-pandemic context, previous research has suggested a link between stress and disordered
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eating in college students (Oliver & Wardle, 1999; Costarelli & Patsai, 2012). By contrast, there are few studies
that have focused on the relationship between stress and disordered eating during the pandemic, and only two
have examined college students (Flaudias et al., 2020; Ramalho et al., 2021). Still, Flaudias et al.’s (2020) research
focused solely on quarantine periods, while Ramalho et al. (2021) investigated psychological distress, which, in
addition to stress, also included depressive symptomatology and anxiety. Consequently, the purpose of this study
was to further investigate the relationship between perceived stress and disordered eating among college students
during the current COVID-19 pandemic.
This study contributed to the COVID-19 pandemic-related literature as it examined a link that has yet to
be thoroughly studied. Additionally, it provided multiple real-world applications. For example, the results could
be used to create resources for college students, including those studying remotely, to help manage their stress.
Moreover, this study could convey the physical and mental health struggles college students are currently facing
in the COVID-19 pandemic to professors and college administrators. If administrators, faculty, and staff are aware
of the mental health issues that some students endure, then campus counseling centers might be better equipped
with the resources needed to cater to every student.
Overall, the purpose of this study was to investigate disordered eating and stress among college students
amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. College students in introductory psychology courses were asked to provide
demographics and respond to various questionnaires that assessed disordered eating, perceived stress, and
perceived stress in the COVID-19 pandemic. Given that previous research has found associations between stress
and disordered eating in a non-pandemic environment (Blodgett Salafia & Lerner, 2012; Gan et al., 2011; King
et al., 2009), it was hypothesized that in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, a strong significant relationship
between disordered eating and stress levels of college students would occur.
Method
Participants
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Participants included 58 students at a small, private liberal arts college who earned 0.5 course credit for
participating. Participants were recruited through the college’s participant pool management system and were
enrolled in introductory psychology courses. Of the 58 students, 38% identified as male, and 62% identified as
female. The majority of participants identified as White or Caucasian (60%); however, 16% identified as Asian
or Pacific Islander, 10% as Black or African American, 3% as Multiracial or Biracial, 9% as Hispanic or Latino,
and 2% as Indian. Additionally, most participants were from the class of 2023 (45%), whereas 41% were from
the class of 2024, 9% from the class of 2022, and 5% from the class of 2021.
Design & Procedure
This study used a correlational design. All participants completed the study online. Once participants
consented to participate, they completed questionnaires assessing disordered eating behaviors (see Appendix A),
college students’ stressful events (see Appendix B), perceived stress (see Appendix C), and perceived stress
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic (see Appendix D). Items assessing college students’ stressful events
and disordered eating were randomized. Participants were then asked demographic questions, which included
gender, class year, race/ethnicity, whether they were currently on-campus/remote, if they were physically active,
and whether they were on a college sports team (see Appendix E). Lastly, participants read the debriefing
statement. Once completed, they were given 0.5 credit for their participation.
Materials & Measures
Disordered Eating
The Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26) was used to measure disordered eating (Garner et al., 1982). The 26item EAT-26 measured disordered eating and consisted of three subscales- the dieting subscale, bulimia and food
preoccupation subscale, and oral control subscale. All three subscales were included in this study. The dieting
subscale asked questions such as “I am aware of the calorie content of foods that I eat,” while the bulimia and
food preoccupation subscale asked questions similar to “I have gone on eating binges where I feel that I may not
be able to stop.” Finally, questions such as “I avoid eating when I am hungry” were asked in the oral control
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subscale. Participants responded to each question by selecting one of the following: always, usually, often,
sometimes, rarely, and never. A response of “always” received three points, “usually” received two points, “often”
received one point, and “sometimes,” “rarely,” and “never” received zero points. Item 26, “I enjoy trying new
food,” was reversed scored. Total scores were obtained by adding all the points together. Higher scores indicated
higher levels of disordered eating. Individuals whose scores were equal to or greater than 20 suggested testing for
a potential eating disorder diagnosis, as they demonstrated an increased risk of having a serious eating disorder.
The EAT-26’s five behavioral questions were also incorporated along with the 26 items. These questions assessed
behaviors within the past six months and asked if the participant had “Gone on eating binges where you feel that
you may not be able to stop?”, “Ever made yourself sick (vomited) to control your weight or shape?”, “Ever used
laxatives, diet pills, or diuretics (water pills) to control your weight or shape?”, “Exercised more than 60 minutes
to lose or to control your weight?”, and “Lost 20 pounds or more in the past 6 months?” Responses included
“never,” “once a month or less,” “2-3 times a month,” “once a week,” “2-6 times a week,” and “once a day or
more.” Finally, participants either marked “yes” or “no” for the last question (“Lost 20 pounds or more in the past
6 months?”). Responses to the five behavioral questions were not given scores; however, anything above “2-3
times a month” for “Gone on eating binges where you feel that you may not be able to stop?”, “once a month or
less” for both “Ever made yourself sick (vomited) to control your weight or shape?” and “Ever used laxatives,
diet pills, or diuretics (water pills) to control your weight or shape?”, and “once a day or more” for “exercised
more than 60 minutes a day to lose or control your weight?” indicated disordered eating that may warrant a
professional evaluation. A response of “yes” for the last question (“Lost 20 pounds or more in the past 6 months”)
also indicated that an evaluation might be needed. The five behavioral questions were included to further examine
participants’ disordered eating. The EAT-26 has demonstrated construct validity and internal consistency with a
Cronbach’s alpha of above .90 (Rivas et al., 2010).
The EAT-26 has been used in numerous studies assessing disordered eating. For example, Jackson et al.
(2006) used the EAT-26 in a study of trans-cultural comparison of disordered eating in Korean women. The study
demonstrated the importance of cultural factors in the development of eating disorders, as Korean-American
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women scored lower on the EAT-26 than native Koreans and Korean immigrants. Additionally, research has
found an association between exercise and negative affect among college women with high EAT-26 scores
(Thome & Espelage, 2004).
Stressful Events in College Students
The College Student’s Stressful Event Checklist (CSSEC) is designed to measure the number of stressful
events experienced by college students within the past year (Educational Outreach and Student Services of
Arizona State University, n.d.). It was adapted from Holmes and Rahe’s Social Readjustment Rating Scale
(SRRS; 1967). Participants were asked to indicate which of the 32 potential stressor events they had experienced
or expected to experience soon. Examples of stressful events included “Problems with a girlfriend or boyfriend,”
“Increased workload at school,” and “Difficulty with roommate(s).” Values were assigned to each event, with the
largest value being 100 (“Death of a close family member”) and the smallest event value of 20 (“Minor traffic
violations”). A total score was obtained by adding all values together. Severe stress corresponded with scores
above 300, 150 to 300 indicated moderate stress, and scores under 150 signified mild stress. Thus, a higher score
suggested higher stressful events experienced. Although information concerning reliability and validity was not
available for the CSSEC, the SRRS has demonstrated reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .72 (Lei & Skinner,
1980). The SRRS has also exhibited predictive validity (McGrath & Burkhart, 1983).
The CSSEC has been used in other studies to measure stressful events in college students. In one study, a
high CSSEC score was correlated with decreased hours of sleep (Massabni, 2019). Therefore, higher stress levels
were associated with lower amounts of sleep. Additionally, Krysinska et al. (2015) used the CSSEC and
determined that stress was a significant predictor of suicide.
Perceived Stress
Perceived stress was measured using the 10-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10; Cohen & Williamson,
1988). Example questions included “In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope with
all the things that you had to do?” and “In the last month, have you felt that you were unable to control the
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important things in your life?” Responses were on a four-point Likert scale with “never” equaling zero points and
“very often” equaling four points. Items four, five, seven, and eight were reverse scored. A total score was
obtained by summing up the scores. Therefore, a higher score suggested a higher level of perceived stress. Balik
et al. (2019) found that the PSS-10 has good internal consistency reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .82, as
well as factorial and convergent validity.
Numerous studies have used the PSS-10 to assess perceived stress. McAlonan et al. (2007) found that
during the 2003 SARS outbreak, health care workers who had a higher risk of contracting SARS had a higher
level of stress, as measured by the PSS-10. Additionally, another study used the PSS-10 to measure stress and
demonstrated that during the current COVID-19 pandemic, lockdown periods were more stressful for younger
adults, women, unemployed individuals, and those with low incomes (Pieh et al., 2020).
Perceived Stress During COVID-19
Pedrozo-Pupo et al. (2020) modified the PSS-10 to measure perceived stress associated with the COVID19 pandemic. The PSS-10-C included 10 items, for example, “I have been nervous or stressed by the epidemic”
and “I have been upset that things related to the epidemic are out of my control.” Responses were on a five-point
scale with “never” receiving zero points and “very often” receiving four points, with items four, five, seven, and
eight being scored reversely. A total score was obtained by summing up the scores, with higher scores indicating
higher levels of perceived stress related to COVID-19. A score of 25 or above was labeled as high in perceived
stress associated with COVID-19. As determined by Pedrozo-Pupo et al., the PSS-10-C demonstrated internal
consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86. Although information on the validity of the PSS-10-C was not
available, the PSS-10 showed factorial and convergent validity (Balik et al., 2019).
As a recently adapted measure, the PSS-10-C has yet to be widely used in psychological research.
However, Pedrozo-Pupo et al. (2020) found that high levels on the PSS-10-C were associated with perceived
inconsistent strategies by the government to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and scientific recommendations.

75

Results
Participant Flow
Data for all 58 participants were included in the analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the key variables can be found in Table 1.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables

Measure

M

SD

Actual
Range

Perspective Stress Scale

33.00

3.58

4 - 37

0 - 40

0.89

21.62

3.16

4 - 33

0 - 40

0.83

College Student's Stressful
Event Checklist
273.79

148.58

0 - 726

0 - 920

-

Eating Attitude Test-26

20.91

0 - 56

0 - 78

0.91

Perspective Stress
COVID-19 Materials

Possible
Range

Cronbach's ɑ

Scale-

11.15

Inferential Statistics
A Spearman’s correlation analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis that there is a strong, positive
relationship between perceived stress and disordered eating in undergraduate students during the COVID-19
pandemic. A Spearman’s correlation was used instead of a Pearson’s correlation due to assumption violations
(normality and outliers). Preliminary analyses indicated a linear relationship between scores on the EAT-26 and
the PSS-10-C (see Figure 1). The bivariate correlations for the key variables can be found in Table 2. Additionally,
consistent with the hypothesis, there was a statistically significant positive correlation between scores on the EAT26 and the PSS-10-C, rs(N = 58) = .31, p = .017. This positive correlation indicates a relationship between
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perceived stress and disordered eating in undergraduate students in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic,
implying that as perceived stress levels increase, disordered eating behaviors also increase, or vice versa.
Figure 1
Scatter plot of scores on the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26) and the Perceived Stress Scale Modified for COVID19 (PSS-10-C)

Note. The scatter plot illustrates the linear relationship between scores on the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26) and
scores on the Perceived Stress Scale Modified for COVID-19 (PSS-10-C).
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Table 2
Bivariate Correlations for Key Variables
Measure

1

2

3

Perspective Stress Scale

-

Perspective Stress Scale- COVID-19 Materials

.546**

-

College Student's Stressful Event Checklist

.330

.288*

-

Eating Attitude Test-26

.223

.313*

.196

4

-

Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2tailed)
Effect Size
Although a positive relationship was found between the EAT-26 and PSS-10-C, the correlation coefficient
(rs(N = 58) = .31) indicates that it is a weak relationship.
Discussion
The present study used a correlational design to investigate a potential relationship between perceived
stress and disordered eating among college students during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through administering the
EAT-26 (Garner et al., 1982), the CSSEC (Educational Outreach and Student Services of Arizona State
University, n.d.), the PSS-10 (Cohen & Williamson, 1988), and the PSS-10-C (Pedrozo-Pupo et al., 2020), the
findings indicated a significant relationship between perceived stress and disordered eating among college
students amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. While the findings support the hypothesis of a link between perceived
stress and disordered eating among college students during the pandemic, it was predicted that a stronger
relationship would occur due to the previous research that found this link in a non-pandemic context (Blodgett
Salafia & Lerner, 2012; Gan et al., 2011; King et al., 2009) and research suggesting an increase in stress (Park et
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al., 2020; Shah et al., 2021) and disordered eating behaviors (Keel et al., 2020; Flaudias et al., 2020) during the
pandemic. Ultimately, this study demonstrated an association between reported perceived stress and disordered
eating levels among college students during the COVID-19 pandemic.
This study’s findings are consistent with previous research that indicated a relationship between stress and
disordered eating during COVID-19 among adults (Ramalho et al., 2021). Additionally, the present study’s results
are compatible with previous research that found links between stress and disordered eating in college students
in a non-pandemic context (Oliver & Wardle, 1999; Costarelli & Patsai, 2012). Finally, this study is also
consistent with Flaudias et al.’s (2020) research that demonstrated a relationship between stress and disordered
among college students in COVID-19 quarantine periods. However, Ball et al.’s (1999) findings that perceived
stress was not significantly correlated with disordered eating behaviors are inconsistent with this study’s findings.
Implications
Although previous studies have demonstrated connections between both increased stress levels in college
students during the COVID-19 pandemic (Park et al., 2020; Shah et al., 2021) and increased disordered eating
(Keel et al., 2020; Flaudias et al., 2020), this research is among the first to combine the two constructs, disordered
eating and perceived stress, among college students during the pandemic. Additionally, this study broadened the
COVID-19 pandemic literature as it examined a link that had yet to be thoroughly studied.
The present study also has several practical implications. For example, since it demonstrated a relationship
between disordered eating and perceived stress during the COVID-19 pandemic, it could be used to create
resources for college students, including those studying remotely who may feel disconnected from campus. Also,
this study may make college administrators and professors aware of how mental health struggles can manifest.
We often acknowledge how stress impacts depression, anxiety, or academic performance; however,
administrators and faculty may not recognize how stress influences eating habits, as this study suggested. Ideally,
if faculty and staff recognized these issues, then services, such as campus counseling centers, may be better
equipped to handle student needs specific to eating issues, such as providing nutritional counseling. The necessity
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for services and support is crucial as disordered eating can lead to eating disorders, which are unfortunately
common on college campuses. In fact, one study found that the ratio of female-to-male positive screenings of
eating disorders was 3-to-1, with approximately 3.6% of males on college campuses struggling with an eating
disorder (Eisenberg et al., 2011). Finally, since previous studies have demonstrated that young people with an
eating disorder, including college-aged students, have a higher risk of severe medical issues and death compared
to their peers (Fichter & Quadflieg, 2016), this study can hopefully reinforce the notion that campus counseling
services need to be able to cater to a wide variety of student needs.
Limitations & Future Directions
Although this study has many real-world implications, there are some limitations that should be taken into
consideration for future research. This study used a correlational design; thus, causation cannot be determined.
Therefore, it is possible that an unknown third variable affected the results, emphasizing the importance of future
research using an experimental approach. Additionally, the participants, students in introductory psychology
courses, were not randomly selected, inhibiting the study’s generalizability. Consequently, this is a limitation as
this study was not reflective of all college students or even small private liberal arts colleges. The study was also
conducted solely online, which can be a limitation as participants may have answered randomly and dishonestly.
Previous research by Al-Salom & Miller (2019) found that half of college students failed at least one validity
check, whereas 11% failed three or more validity checks when participating in online research. Furthermore, AlSalom and Miller (2019) also conducted the study in-person and found less validity check fails, with zero
participants failing three or more validity checks. As a result, subsequent research should take an in-person
experimental approach and use random selection to determine cause and effect and improve generalizability.
Future research should also investigate the differences in the relationship between disordered eating and
perceived stress during the COVID-19 pandemic for college students who live residentially on campus and those
studying at home, as previous research by Husky et al. (2020) found that college students who relocated to
quarantine with their parents had lower levels of stress than those who lived on campus. Therefore, it is plausible
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that location may affect one’s perceived stress or access to well-balanced meals. Future studies should also record
family income as a part of the demographic section, as a prior study suggested that those who experienced income
loss or financial strain due to the COVID-19 pandemic suffered from more mental health symptoms, including
increased stress (Hertz-Palmor et al., 2020). By incorporating this question, researchers may be able to more
effectively single out stressors and determine if a particular one has a stronger relationship with disordered eating
than others. Additionally, future research should ask if the participant is an international college student. One
study found that international students who stayed in their institution country reported increased mental health
problems, including anxiety and stress, during the COVID-19 pandemic (Lai et al., 2020). By taking this into
consideration for future studies, researchers may be more effective in identifying the types of resources college
students need and how to implement them. Finally, future research may also want to assess reported levels of
disordered eating and perceived stress among populations other than college students. For example, research by
Blodgett Salafia & Lerner (2012) has demonstrated that even among middle school-aged children, there is already
a relationship between levels of perceived stress and disordered eating. Therefore, research should examine this
link in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic as it may allow educators and professionals to recognize how
younger students are also negatively affected by the pandemic and how to best provide resources for students.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study used a correlational design and demonstrated a relationship between disordered
eating and perceived stress among college students amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings have numerous
implications and provide insight into the high prevalence of college students who engage in disordered eating
behaviors and their relationship to perceived stress.
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Appendix A

Eating Attitudes Test (EAT-26)

Please fill out the below form as accurately, honestly, and completely as possible. There are no right or wrong answers.
Please only select one response per statement.

Check a response for each of the
following statements:
Always

Usually

Often

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I am aware of the calorie content of
foods that I eat

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I particularly avoid food with a high
carbohydrate content (i.e. bread,
rice, potatoes, etc.)

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I feel that others would prefer if I
ate more

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I am terrified about being
overweight
I avoid eating when I am hungry

I find myself preoccupied with food

I have gone on eating binges where
I feel that I may not be able to stop
I cut my food into small pieces

I vomit after I have eaten
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I feel extremely guilty after eating

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I am preoccupied with a desire to be
thinner

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I think about burning up calories
with I exercise

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I am preoccupied with the thought
of having fat on my body

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I take longer than others to eat my
meals

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I give too much time and through to
food

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I feel uncomfortable after eating
sweets

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

Other people think that I am too thin

I avoid foods with sugar in them

I eat diet foods

I feel that food controls my life

I display self-control around food

I feel that others pressure me to eat
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I engage in dieting behavior

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

Never

Once a
month or
less

2-3 times
a month

Once a week

2-6 times a
week

Once a
day or
more

Gone on eating binges where you
feel that you may not be able to stop

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

Ever made yourself sick (vomited)
to control your weight or shape?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

Ever used laxatives, diet pills, or
diuretics (water pills) to control
your weight or shape?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

Exercised more than 60 minutes a
day to lose or to control your
weight?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

Lost 20 pounds or more in the past 6
months

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I like my stomach to be empty

I have the impulse to vomit after
meals
I enjoy trying new rich foods

In the past 6 months have you:
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Appendix B

College Student’s Stressful Event Checklist

Please select the events that have occurred in your life recently or that you expect to occur soon. Select all that apply
.
❐ Death of a close family member
❐ Death of a close friend
❐ Divorce between parents
❐ Serious legal problems
❐ Major personal injury or illness
❐ Responsibilities for others, such as children/spouse
❐ Threat to a major source of income
❐ Difficulty with roommate(s)
❐ Change in health of a family member
❐ Pregnancy
❐ Sexual problems
❐ Serious disagreements with parents
❐ Change in lifestyle for financial reasons
❐ Difficulty in identifying a major
❐ Serious argument with a close family member
❐ Problems with a girlfriend or boyfriend
❐ Having to repeat a course
❐ Increased workload at school
❐ Outstanding personal achievement
❐ First semester in college
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❐ Change in living conditions
❐ Serious disagreements with an instructor
❐ Lower grades than expected
❐ Change in sleeping habits
❐ Change in social habits
❐ Change in eating habits
❐ Chronic car problems
❐ Change in number of family get togethers
❐ Too many missed classes
❐ Change in plans for a major
❐ Dropped more than one class
❐ Minor traffic violations

92
Appendix C

Perceived Stress Scale

The questions in this scale ask about your feelings and thoughts during the last month. In each case, you will be asked to
indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way. Although some of the questions are similar, there are differences
between them, and you should treat each one as a separate question. The best approach is to answer fairly quickly. That is,
don’t try to count up the number of times you felt a particular way; rather indicate the alternative that seems like a
reasonable estimate. Please select one response per question.

Check a response for each of the
following questions:
Never

Almost Never

Sometimes

Fairly Often

Very Often

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

In the last month, how often have
you felt nervous and stressed?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

In the last month, how often have
you felt confident about your ability
to handle your personal problems?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

In the last month, how often have
you felt that things were going your
way?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

In the last month, how often have
you been upset because of
something that happened
unexpectedly?
In the last month, how often have
you felt that you were unable to
control the important things in your
life?

In the last month, how often have
you found that you could not cope
with all the things that you had to
do?
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In the last month, how often have
you been able to control irritations
in your life?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

In the last month, how often have
you felt that you were on top of
things?

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

In the last month, how often have
you been angered because of things
that happened that were outside of
your control?
In the last month, how often have
you felt difficulties were piling up
so high that you could not overcome
them?
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Appendix D

COVID-19 Supplementary Material

The questions in this scale ask about your feelings and thoughts during the COVID-19 pandemic. In each case, you will
be asked to indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way. Although some of the questions are similar, there are
differences between them, and you should treat each one as a separate question. The best approach is to answer fairly
quickly. That is, don’t try to count up the number of times you felt a particular way; rather indicate the alternative that
seems like a reasonable estimate. Please select one response per question.

Check a response for each of the
following statements:
Never

Almost Never

Sometimes

Fairly Often

Very Often

I have felt affected as if something
serious will happen unexpectedly
with the pandemic.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have felt that I am unable to
control the important things in my
life due to the pandemic.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have been nervous or stressed by
the pandemic.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have been confident about my
ability to handle my personal
pandemic-related problems.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have felt that things are going well
(optimistic) with the pandemic.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have felt unable to cope with the
things I have to do to control the
possible infection.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have felt that I can control the
difficulties that could appear in my
life due to the infection.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐
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have felt that I have everything
under control in relation to the
pandemic.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have been upset that things related
to the pandemic are out of my
control.

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

❐

I have felt that the difficulties
accumulate in these days of the
pandemic and I feel unable to
overcome them.
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Appendix E

Demographics Questionnaire
What is your gender?
❐ Male
❐ Female
❐ Non-binary/ third gender
❐ Prefer not to say
❐ Prefer to self-identify: ___________
Which of the following best describes you?
Please select one answer
❐ Asian or Pacific Islander
❐ Black/African American
❐ Native American or Alaskan native
❐ White or Caucasian
❐ Multiracial or Biracial
❐ Hispanic/Latino
❐ A race/ethnicity not listed here: ___________
Please indicate your class year:
❐ Class of 2024
❐ Class of 2023
❐ Class of 2022
❐ Class of 2021
Are you studying on-campus or remotely?
❐ On-campus
❐ Remotely
Which class are you participating in this study for?
❐ PSY 100
❐ SPM 100
Would you consider yourself a physically active student?
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❐ Yes
❐ No
Are you on a sports team?
❐ Yes
❐ No
If you answered “Yes” to being on a sports team, please indicate which team: ___________
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The Voluntary Carbon Market: Managing the Private
Provision of Public Goods - Atticus Maloney, Swarthmore College
Introduction: What Are Carbon Offsets?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a statement in 2018 that warned a “rapid
and far-reaching” transition is needed by 2030 to limit the impact of climate change to 1.5 degrees Celsius and
avoid pushing natural systems past a dangerous tipping point (Ahmed et al., 2020). To reach this goal it will be
necessary for companies, organizations, and individuals, around the world to dramatically reduce their greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. Yet, in the short term, some entities will be unable to meet their reduction goals while
continuing to provide their product or service. Additionally, emissions reduction potential is not spread
homogeneously among firms: some companies and organizations can reduce and sequester emissions much more
cost effectively than others. Regardless of the origin of GHG emissions, they have an equal impact on the
progression of climate change. Thus, to account for unavoidable short-term emissions, firms can pay to have their
remaining emissions reduced or sequestered elsewhere. This action allows companies to more easily meet “carbon
neutrality goals” and other green initiatives that respond consumer demand for climate action. Making payments
to reduce or sequester emissions is called “carbon offsetting” with the equivalent of one ton of carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions being referred to as a “carbon credit”. The terms “carbon emissions" and “carbon offsets” often
encompass other forms of GHGs such as methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). These gases are given a “carbon
equivalency” or quantity of CO2 emissions that equal their warming potential. Carbon offset projects can take on
a variety of forms including emissions capture, renewable energy investments, and nature-based sequestration
(Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010).
Carbon offsetting was popularized by the Kyoto Protocol, an international attempt to save the climate
through the commodification of carbon dioxide. This agreement established the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), the world’s largest compliance market for carbon credits. A compliance market creates demand for
offsets via government enforced emissions caps while allowing these goals to be met through the purchase of
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carbon credits. The United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and, as a result, compliance offsets do not
play a large role in the domestic space. Instead, the majority of offsets traded in the United States go through the
voluntary carbon offset market (Conte et al., 2010). Voluntary offsets differ from those for compliance purposes
in that they are provided by companies without emissions caps or reduction targets. The majority of these credits
are traded on a deal-by-deal basis in the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) market (Corbera et al., 2009). This
paper will focus specifically on the OTC market and refer to it by the general term: voluntary carbon market.
Offsetting the impacts of global climate change through carbon offsets can be characterized as the private
provision of a public good, begging the question of why individuals and firms choose to participate in the
voluntary market. This paper will outline several incentives, both on the individual and corporate level, that
support this provision. While the compliance offset market is kept in line through strict guidelines and an
extensive project approval process, the voluntary market faces no required regulations. This lack of oversight
creates unique opportunities and challenges for offset purchasers and suppliers. One major opportunity is the
financing of projects that support other sustainable development goals (such as poverty reduction or global health)
besides emissions reductions referred to as “co-benefits.” Many of these projects are unable to make it through
the strict CDM approval process. One such example is agriculture and forestry-based offsets that are barred from
the CDM yet are popular in the voluntary offset space due to their ample co-benefits. The reduced level of
regulation in voluntary markets also exacerbates latent offsetting concerns that stem from an informational
asymmetry between consumers and producers. To mitigate these concerns and take full advantage of the market’s
benefits, regulations are needed that ensure project quality while maintaining the freedoms that distinguish the
voluntary market.
Carbon Offsets as a Public Good
Global climate change brings with it many adverse conditions that will negatively impact human
wellbeing. The productive capacity of the land, livable ambient temperatures, and stable weather conditions will
all be diminished through the progression of climate change. Each of these can be referred to as “public goods”
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as they are both non-rival (one person’s enjoyment of them does not diminish another person’s ability to enjoy
them) and non-excludable (it is nearly impossible to restrict one’s access to these things). Reduction or offsetting
emissions to mitigate climate change can provide greater levels of these goods to everyone. In this way, the
mitigation of climate change is also a non-rival and non-excludable public good. Basic economic theory
hypothesizes on the basis of the free rider problem that the private sector will tend to under-provide other public
goods such as infrastructure or education (Gruber, 2019). In the case of climate change, the logic of the free rider
problem suggests that since one company’s enjoyment of favorable environmental conditions is not solely
dependent on its own emissions offsetting, it will purchase fewer carbon credits than is socially optimal.
Compliance-based carbon markets make use of government regulation to correct for this under-provision.
They build on the work of Ronald Coase whose theorem states when there are well-defined property rights and
costless bargaining, negotiations between the party generating the externality (GHG emissions) and the party
affected can bring about the socially optimal market quantity (Gruber, 2019). This idea of property rights informs
the basis of cap-and-trade programs like those highly active in the European Union. Here a regulator will set an
aggregate cap on the use of a public good (GHG emissions) and allocate property rights to companies so that the
quantity of use is not exceeded. Under this system, firms that reduce their emissions more cost-effectively, can
trade their property rights with less sustainable firms (Dormady et al., 2015). This trading scheme greatly lowers
the overall regulatory cost relative to a flat mandate while meeting the same emissions reduction target (Gruber,
2019). The Kyoto Protocol goes beyond this localized version of cap-and-trade through the introduction of
compliance carbon offsets. This policy allows institutions to source their offsets from approved projects globally,
effectively extending the jurisdictional boundaries of cap-and-trade to the global scale. These compliance offsets
further reduce the cost of meeting emissions reduction targets while providing funds for environmentally
conscious projects worldwide. Due to the government incentive to purchase compliance offsets, the size of the
voluntary market is far smaller in comparison. However, it is quite a bit larger than would be suggested by the
traditional model for the private provision of a public good.
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Private Provision of Carbon Offsets
The Kyoto Protocol and other policies have worked to overcome the free rider problem through the
assignment of property rights. Yet, even in sectors without required emission reductions, the provision of climate
change mitigation in the form of offsets is surprisingly high. A United Nations task force recently estimated that
the voluntary market for carbon credits could be worth upward of $50 billion by 2030 (Blaufelder et al., 2021).
This growth is fueled by the interest and investments of large corporations as demonstrated by the popularity of
offsets among the 100 most capitalized companies on the UK stock exchange (Corbera et al., 2009). The observed
level of offset consumption is surprising given a traditional understanding of public goods: if people can enjoy
the benefits of pleasant environmental quality without purchasing offsets themselves, they should have little
incentive to contribute and make these purchases. However, this free rider problem is reduced in the case of
imperfect public goods that provide both public and private benefits.
The purchase of carbon offsets not only mitigates the level of global climate change but also provides
significant personal benefits. Purchasing carbon offsets can provide people with a sense of joy and satisfaction
for “doing their part” to advert the climate crisis. This emotional response is described as “warm glow” and can
lead to greater provision of a public good than would be expected in the free market (Gruber, 2019). Voluntary
carbon offset purchases are also associated strongly with the alleviation of guilt. The literature often compares
the purchase of carbon offsets to indulgences that are paid to the church to account for one’s sins (Kotchen,
“Offsetting Green Guilt,” 2009). Professor of economics at Yale School of the Environment, Matthew J. Kotchen,
looks at the impact of guilt on individual consumption behavior. He envisions a model of private-public goods
provision that accounts for individuals offsetting activities that hurt the available level of a public good. With the
addition of this offsetting behavior, the model comes far closer to reflecting the empirical evidence on public
goods provision in carbon offset markets (Kotchen, “Voluntary Provision of,” 2009). These individual
motivations for the purchase of carbon offsets compound at the firm level affect institutional purchasing decisions.
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Beyond the personal drives of their employees, firms are also motivated to increase their level of voluntary
offset consumption by strategic incentives. Notable companies such as IBM, Microsoft, Unilever, Coca-Cola, and
Uber to name a few, have gone beyond cursory offset purchasing to commit to carbon neutrality. This “carbon
norm” signifies that these companies are required to produce net zero GHG emissions. Firms meet this goal
through a combination of emission reductions and the purchase of offsets. It seems to contradict basic
microeconomic theory for a private firm to voluntarily impose restrictions on its operations to provide a greater
level of a public good. Yet, companies are incentivized by the influence of their stakeholders and the benefits of
strategic positioning to self-regulate their emissions. The growing trend of conscious consumption has led the
biggest corporate stakeholder, the consumer, to more kindly view firms that take part in widely recognized
environmental efforts such as carbon neutrality (Pinkse, 2013). As a result, corporations often see increases in
stock prices and sales associated with commitment to climate initiatives. Other stakeholders, such as NGOs and
government agencies also pressure corporations to further their movement towards sustainability (Pinkse, 2013).
Long-term corporate strategy is supported via neutrality goals, allowing firms to differentiate their capabilities
from competitors, adapt to rising energy prices, and profit from emissions trading (Corbera et al., 2009).
Corporations that view sustainability as a future norm for their industry can take immediate action to establish
leadership in environmental efforts moving forward.
Voluntary carbon offsets behave as an impure public good as there are many private reasons, both on the
individual and corporate level, that encourage their consumption. As the market for this offset type is large and
growing, it is necessary to ask whether or not the purchase of voluntary carbon offsets truly contributes to the
sustainable development of planet earth.
Benefits of Voluntary Carbon Offsets
Voluntary Carbon Offsets not only reduce GHG emission levels but also provide multiple “co-benefits”
that support the other sustainable development goals (SDGs) established by the United Nations. The lack of
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regulation in the voluntary space lowers barrier to entry for projects, enabling greater innovation, efficiency, and
the entrance of small-scale projects.
Meeting the quality standard for compliance-based offsets involves a lengthy five-step process with high
transaction costs, especially for projects that break from the traditional structure. These bureaucratic constraints
prevent many smaller projects from benefiting from the sale of their offsets in the compliance market. As a result,
a survey of offset projects shows that the number of small-scale projects and their contribution to carbon credit
volumes in the voluntary markets is far higher than in the compliance market. This is a considerable benefit of
the voluntary market given that small-scale projects also generally provide better social and economic benefits
than large ones (Corbera et al., 2009). The lower barrier to entry to the voluntary market also increases overall
market efficiency (removing bureaucratic overhead) and reduces the price of offsets (voluntary offsets tend to sell
for about 30% less than those approved by the CDM) (Conte et al., 2010). The latter point is essential to
maintaining levels of private provision. Since corporations in the voluntary space are not required to purchase
offsets, they likely have a high demand elasticity and be very responsive to changes in price. Even a small price
increase could dramatically reduce voluntary offset consumption. Finally, lowering the barrier to entry for
unconventional projects induces greater levels of innovation in the voluntary market, allowing it to adapt quickly
to new technologies and novel offset methods (Lovell, 2010).
Compliance-based offset markets not only put projects through a lengthy approval process but also prevent
certain project types from entering the market at all. Significantly, agriculture and forestry-based projects are not
commonly accepted into the compliance market. The provision of this project type is a major benefit to the
voluntary offset market as agricultural offsets are both low cost and provide multiple co-benefits. A 2019 report
by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine found that agricultural carbon sequestration
was one of the most cost-effective means of reducing GHG emissions (U.S. Library of Congress, 2019). Many of
the practices used to reduce emissions through agriculture also improve the well-being of the land and people
involved in the process of food production.
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Empirical studies have shown that agricultural and reforestation carbon offsets provide co-benefits that
include improved soil, animal, and ecosystem health. Kurkalova et al. showed in their study on Iowa conversation
tillage that paying farmers for reductions in carbon output also reduces nitrogen runoff, wind erosion, and water
erosion97 (González-Ramírez et al., 2012). Many of the methods used to reduce emissions on farms also provide
benefits to the water, soil, and farm animals. Fertilizer and land-use changes not only reduce emissions and
nitrogen leakage to waterways but also improve soil health. Improved animal health monitoring and illness
prevention minimizes emissions from enteric fermentation and increases animal well-being (Ahmed et al., 2020).
Agricultural carbon offsets not only mitigate climate change but also increase the sustainability of food systems
by supporting the health of the land and animals involved in the food production process.
Another significant co-benefit of agricultural offsets is greater financial security to farmers. Out of 25
measures identified by McKinsey and Company as reducing total CO2 emissions on the farm, 15 are cost-saving
or cost-neutral for the farmer (Ahmed et al., 2020). These changes have primarily been constrained from
implementation by capital constraints, limited technology access, and commitment to traditional farming
practices. However, the provision of carbon credits can help to overcome these initial capital barriers and create
the incentive necessary to cause farmers to take up these new practices. A study by Feng et al. shows that carbon
offsetting provides immediate financial support to farmers through an income support benefit and pricing cobenefit. The first benefit is the improvement to financial stability from offset payments, reducing farmers’
vulnerability to perennial price and weather shocks. The second pricing benefit comes from the additional revenue
stream that carbon offsetting provides, allowing farmers to charge higher prices for agricultural commodities
(Gonzalez-Remirez et al., 2012). The sale of agricultural carbon credits improves the financial security of farmers
in both the short and long term, supporting the people most intimately involved in food production to generate
the long term co-benefit of food system security.

97

the full citation for the Kurkalova et al. piece cited by Gonzáles-Ramírez et al., 2012 is Kurkalova et al., 2004.
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The voluntary carbon offsets market provides several unique benefits that cannot be found in the
compliance market. These advantages stem from a flexible regulatory environment that lowers the barrier to entry
for offset approval. Lower regulation increases efficiency through reduced administrative costs and allows for the
permeation of innovative projects. It also provides a venue for projects, such as those in agriculture and forestry,
that have been excluded from the compliance market. Agricultural projects provide a particular example of a lowcost project with many co-benefits that could not be traded outside the voluntary market. The lack of mandated
regulation enables the voluntary market to provide offsets with a variety of additional benefits beyond GHG
mitigation.
Limitations of The Voluntary Offset Market
While voluntary carbon offsets have enormous potential as a low-cost, innovative solution for climate
change mitigation, they are subject to implementation challenges that can undermine their positive effects. These
challenges stem from offsets being both intangible (there is no immediate physical result of your purchase) and
reductive (where payments are made to reduce a certain activity). Both qualities exacerbate the informational
asymmetry between offset producers and consumers: the supplier knows far more about the quality of the offset
project than the purchaser does. As in insurance markets, this asymmetry leads to market failures that can
undermine the offset’s overall environmental impact.
Additionality
The central talking point in the debate over carbon offset regulation is additionality. To be specific,
additionality is an emissions reduction or sequestration that results in a lower level of net greenhouse gas
emissions or atmospheric concentration than would occur in the absence of an offset project (Bushnell, 2011).
This complex definition begs the simple question: Does the added revenue from selling greenhouse gas credits
enable a project’s implementation or does it just line the pockets of someone who would have implemented the
project anyway? In practice, additionality is observed by comparing the impact of reduction activities to a baseline
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emissions level. This is a difficult challenge in any carbon market given that baseline measurement is the product
of a ‘what if’ exercise.
The problem of additionality is effectively illustrated by the example of the farmer who can sequester
carbon in her land via no-till operations (the process of tilling releases CO2 stored in the soil). For the farmer to
generate credible offsets, these no-till operations must be induced solely by the potential financial gain from the
offset market. If no-till farming was part of normal operations before a gain could be made by offsetting, then the
project would fail the additionality test. Many farmers that have been using this novel technique for years have
just recently started receiving offset compensation. This is a straightforward instance of a non-additional offset.
The example above highlights the complexity of judging whether an offset is additional. This process is difficult
enough in the compliance market and is exacerbated by the flexibility of regulation in the voluntary space. The
voluntary market lacks a common credible procedure to compare and select emissions reduction projects, making
it difficult for the consumer to deduce project quality and rule out non-additional projects. The offset literature
often blindly focuses on additionality without examining the mechanisms that contribute to a non-additional
project. As in insurance markets, informational asymmetry in the carbon market creates problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection. Together, these mechanisms account for the uncertainty surrounding project additionality
in the voluntary offset market.
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is the threat of detrimental behavior inspired by informational asymmetry and flexible
regulation of the voluntary offset market. Emission baselines are often the private information of offset suppliers
and can also be readily influenced by those suppliers. These firms face an adverse incentive to actively invest in
high carbon sources only to reduce those investments in exchange for offset payments. An example of this
occurred with compliance market payments for the mitigation of HFC-23 emissions. These payments were large
enough that their value exceeded that of the product whose production emitted HFC-23. As a result, firms
expanded and maintained production to capture more HFC-23 and qualify for the payments (Bushnell, 2011).
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Moral hazard is intensified by the low level of regulation in the voluntary carbon offset market. Due to
the lack of a centralized monitoring agency, projects rely on multiple third-party regulators with heterogeneous
standards for approval. There is no legal regulation for the enforcement of contracts, enabling two parties to sell
the same reduction or a single party to sell a reduction to multiple buyers (Gillenwater et al., 2007). This,
combined with inconsistent project monitoring methods, contributes to hesitancy about the permanence of a
voluntary carbon offset. Permanence is defined by the CDM as the length of carbon storage provided by the offset
and the risk of releasing that carbon back into the atmosphere (Seeberg-Elverfeldlt, 2010). For example, if a
farmer that uses no-till techniques to sequester carbon in the soil reverts to old practices, all that stored carbon
will be released and contribute to warming levels. This is a threat for voluntary offsets because unstable contracts
and lack of consistent monitoring leave few barriers to prevent offset suppliers from reverting to baseline
emissions. Inconsistent standards, monitoring, and enforcement in the voluntary offset market make it vulnerable
to the impacts of moral hazard.
Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is the danger that offset projects providing less environmental benefit face a greater
incentive to join the market. This can be seen in the case of providers whose true emissions baselines are lower
than regulators estimate. They essentially earn a “free lunch” by joining the offset market, getting an extra
paycheck for their business-as-usual (BAU) operations. Another example of adverse selection is the supply of
voluntary offset projects that involve leakage. Leakage is defined by the CDM as the unplanned and indirect GHG
emissions from project activities (Seeberg-Elverfeldlt, 2010). If an offset supplier can easily lower the emissions
of one part of her operations by increasing the emissions of another part, she may be motivated to sell offsets for
the first operational change. In both these scenarios, offset money is spent to incite behavior that does not decrease
atmospheric GHG concentrations on net. These examples demonstrate that the provision of a less additional offset
often provides greater rewards to the offset supplier. In the first case, the supplier makes no changes to BAU
operations and can earn an extra paycheck. In the second case, instead of making fundamental changes to her
operations, the offset supplier simply shifts emissions from one part of the production to another. Compared to
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offsets that provide real additional decreases to atmospheric GHG concentrations, these low-quality offsets incur
far fewer costs on their suppliers. The cost-benefit ratio of low-quality offset projects could create a perverse
incentive leading to a high proliferation of these projects on the voluntary market. This danger is heightened by
the voluntary market often acting as a “backup option” for projects that cannot qualify for compliance markets
such as the CDM. Lacking the regulation to offset adverse selection, the voluntary market is exposed to a growing
proliferation of low-quality offsets that may not result in real emissions reductions.
As both intangible and subtractive goods, carbon offsets create a high degree of informational asymmetry
between producers and consumers. The offset supplier faces numerous perverse incentives, supported by this
asymmetry, to produce low-quality and non-additional offsets. Through a strict project approval process,
compliance markets like the CDM attempt to reduce the dangers resulting from this asymmetry. Facing little to
no regulation in the voluntary offsets market, these concerns of adverse selection and moral hazard can run
rampant. They call into question the additionality of offsets purchased on the market, making it clear that
government regulation is necessary to ensure offset quality.
Approaching Regulations
The potential limitations of voluntary carbon offsets present a significant market failure that requires
government regulation to increase efficiency. A market failure results from problems that cause a market economy
to deliver an outcome that does not maximize efficiency (Gruber, 2019). One classic market failure is that of a
negative externality. The current operations of the voluntary carbon market present a severe negative externality
in the form of reduced environmental quality. Neither the suppliers nor the purchasers of low-quality voluntary
offsets feel the immediate negative impacts of the transaction, instead, the global population feels its indirect
effects in the form of aggravated climate change. The regulations to correct this externality will need to strike a
balance between the strict project review process of the CDM and the current laissez-faire nature of the voluntary
market. It will be essential to consider the benefits that result from this market flexibility as well as understand
the private market context in which these regulations will be established. In general, three key strategies can be
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used to reduce the fear of non-additionality while maintaining freedoms in the voluntary offset market:
programmatic review of offsets, market consolidation, and overestimation using a government-defined carbon
norm.
The voluntary offset market suffers not from a lack of regulation, but a lack of standardized regulation
that prioritizes the reduction of GHG emissions. Over 98% of voluntary offsets were verified by some third-party
standard in 2015 (“VCS Again Voted”, 2016). Yet, the voluntary market makes use of over 17 different standards
for project certification each with its own protocols and approval process. The most popular standards include the
Climate Action Reserve (CAR), American Carbon Registry (ACR), Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), and Gold
Standard (GS). Of these standards, the VCS is the most prominent, claiming nearly 50% of the total market share
(Lovell, 2010). The VCS and other third-party offset standards work to strike the balance between flexibility and
additionality in the market. They are trusted by many companies and, as a result, attempts to impose government
regulations on the voluntary space will need to take these regulators into account. This was a lesson learned by
the UK government in 2009 when they established a centralized accreditation program for voluntary offsets that
would only certify those approved by the CDM market. Offset suppliers simply bypassed the government
accreditation completely as the leading voluntary standards of VCS and GS were excluded. This regulation aimed
to be too strict, robbing the voluntary market of its freedoms by imposing the same standards applied to
compliance offsets. It demonstrated that the UK government was out of touch with the voluntary offset space and
showed the importance of considering existing market players when imposing new regulations (Lovell, 2010). It
will be essential to build from the self-regulatory methods currently established in the voluntary market when
creating policy solutions.
Programmatic Review
While keeping in mind the current standards that have been self-imposed by the voluntary market, there
are a few ways that policy can centralize regulation to reduce concerns in the voluntary offset space. The CDM
makes use of a review process to estimate baselines that has been criticized as too onerous and inadequate in
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weeding out non-additional projects (Bushnell, 2011). One way to mitigate the resources spent on baseline
estimation is grouping offsets by sector and undertaking a programmatic review of projects. According to
Bushnell, if the baseline emissions of offset suppliers in a given sector are highly correlated, a regulator can
estimate what emissions should be under a BAU scenario (Bushnell, 2011). If firms can reduce or sequester
emissions to move below that level, they are awarded payments for their offsets. While there will be suppliers
that receive payment despite already being under the offset cutoff, Bushnell calls this type of adverse selection
“coincidental” and dismisses its negative impact as these firms’ lower emissions still mitigate the effects of
climate change (Bushnell, 2011). This approach of programmatic review also enables easier evaluation of the
agriculture and deforestation projects that have been barred from compliance markets (Bushnell, 2011). Another
application of programmatic review is the use of randomized trials to gauge voluntary offset effectiveness. To
accomplish this, one population of project applications would be chosen to supply offsets while the other would
be used as a control group against which to judge the additionality of offset payments. If the treatment group’s
emissions did not decrease by more than the control group, the offset payments would be ruled non-additional.
Through the programmatic review of project baselines, a centralized regulator can reduce the barriers to entry for
project approval while mitigating additionality concerns.
Market Consolidation
As discussed above, programmatic review greatly increases the efficiency of project approval. This kind
of review process is enabled by high project volumes that allow for ample data collection and the formation of
experiment and control groups. This process would be greatly benefited by a consolidation of the market for 3rd
party offset verification. Similarly, the current problem of credit quality heterogeneity could be minimized
through a centralized approval process that establishes shared principles for the description of voluntary offsets.
A unified, transparent online project tracking system would reduce concerns surrounding the permanence of
offsets. Each of these changes benefit from a centralized authority taking charge of voluntary offset market
regulation. With the cautionary tale of the UK government’s attempt at regulation in mind, the US government
could select an already popular private sector entity to manage this centralized standard. Effectively, this would
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be the creation of a government-sponsored monopoly. Often this occurs in the case of natural monopolies that
produce large efficiency benefits through economies of scale allowing a single firm to better serve the market at
a lower cost than any combination of smaller firms. Railway infrastructure, electricity grids, and national
broadband networks are all common examples of natural, government-sponsored, monopolies. The natural
monopoly case also applies to government sponsorship of carbon market regulation. Monopoly verification would
take advantage of the high volumes necessary to conduct programmatic review and reduce project approval costs.
It would also establish the common standards and monitoring methods necessary to reduce market heterogeneity.
Given that the government will only have to enforce regulations on a single firm, it will more easily be able to
track contract disputes. The current market leader in the voluntary space is the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)
with a significant market share. In order to avoid “reinventing the wheel,” it would be reasonable for the
government to contract with this group to form a monopoly over voluntary offset verification.
Overestimation
While programmatic review and consolidation can reduce the limitations of voluntary carbon offsets, there
remains a good deal of uncertainty as to whether they can provide a similar benefit to direct emissions reductions.
This is a major concern given that the level of global warming is quickly nearing tipping points that will have
drastic impacts on life on planet Earth. In addition to implementing the policies outlined above, the government
will need to control this uncertainty in the voluntary market. One way to do this in the compliance market is by
tightening the emissions cap on offset purchasers (Bushnell, 2011). This solution assumes some abatement loss
due to adverse selection and moral hazard tries to account for both by overestimating the total abatement
necessary. While there is no government-mandated “cap” in the voluntary market, there are corporate norms such
as carbon neutrality that establish best practices for environmentally concerned companies. The government could
standardize requirements for neutrality claims, mandating that carbon credits be purchased in excess of emissions
levels to qualify for carbon neutrality. There is precedent for this kind of intervention in the USDA’s certified
organic label that appears only on foods that meet specific production guidelines. In the same way, the
government’s carbon neutrality label would put strict standards on what it means to be carbon neutral.
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Informational asymmetry makes the carbon market vulnerable to the problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard, putting into question the additionality of offsets. The voluntary market is especially vulnerable to
these issues given its fragmented and inconsistent regulatory environment. These troubles represent fundamental
market failures in the voluntary market and signal a need for government intervention. The government will need
to balance regulation with the benefits that the market currently reaps from a great degree of freedom. It will also
need to consider the self-regulatory mechanisms that are already in place. Three possible avenues exist to maintain
this balance while mitigating market failures. The first is a programmatic review of offsets, evaluating them by
sector or group rather than individually. The second is a consolidation of market ideals and reporting strategies.
Both aims could be met through the establishment of a government-regulated monopoly on offset verification.
The third acts as a catch-all for possible oversights in the former solutions. It establishes a government standard
for carbon neutrality that requires offset purchases to be made in excess of remaining emissions. This assumes
some remaining loss of emissions reduction due to adverse selection and moral hazard and controls for it via a
net negative emissions mandate. Together, these solutions could mitigate the negative consequences of
informational asymmetry while enabling the voluntary offset market to provide its considerable benefits.
Conclusion
In order to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, individuals, companies, and organizations need to
take drastic action to reduce their emissions of GHGs. In the short-term, some entities cannot make the necessary
reductions while continuing to supply their product or service. Carbon offsets provide the opportunity for these
individuals and firms to pay someone else to reduce or sequester those unavoidable short-term emissions. As the
urgency of climate change increases, the demand for carbon offsets is expected to skyrocket. By some estimates
this could result in an increase in the voluntary market’s size by a factor of 15 over the next decade (Blaufelder
et al., 2021). As the market blossoms, it will be more important than ever to have the proper regulations in place
to counteract the moral hazard and adverse selection concerns involved in the provision of voluntary offsets.
Throughout my research on this topic, it became clear that offsets are one small part of transitioning firms towards
greater sustainability. They are a useful band-aid that can buy companies and organizations the time necessary to

113

make more fundamental and long-lasting changes that result in lower emissions. In future research I am interested
in focusing on the mechanisms involved in these long-term changes. I would like to take a closer look at the
incentives, such as carbon taxes or consumer pressure, necessary to initiate fundamental change and the most
cost-effective pathways for implementation, such as a circular economic framework or traditional efficiency
measures. In this way I hope to expand my scope to cover the full range of opportunities available to incentivize
and implement a sustainable transition.

114
References
Ahmed, Justin, Elaine Almeida, Daniel Aminetzah, Nicolas Denis, Kimberly Henderson, Joshua Katz, Hannah Kitchel,
and Peter Mannion. “Agriculture and Climate Change,” McKinsey & Company, April 2020.

Bushnell, James. “The Economics of Carbon Offsets.” The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy, University
of Chicago Press, 2011, pp. 197–209.

Blaufelder, Christopher, Cindy Levy, Peter Mannion, and Dickon Pinner, “A Blueprint for Scaling Voluntary Carbon
Markets to Meet the Climate Challenge,” McKinsey & Company, January 2021.

Conte, Marc, and Matthew Kotchen. “Explaining the Price of Voluntary Carbon Offsets.” Climate Change Economics,
vol. 01, no. 02, 2010, pp. 93–111., doi:10.1142/s2010007810000091.

Corbera, Esteve, Manuel Estrada, and Katrina Brown. “How Do Regulated and Voluntary Carbon-Offset Schemes
Compare?” Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, vol. 6, no. 1, 2009, pp. 25–50.,
doi:10.1080/15693430802703958.

Dalsgaard, Steffen. “The Commensurability of Carbon.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, pp.
80–98., doi:10.14318/hau3.1.006.

Dhanda, K. Kathy, and Laura P. Hartman. “The Ethics of Carbon Neutrality: A Critical Examination of Voluntary Carbon
Offset Providers.” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 100, no. 1, 2011, pp. 119–149., doi:10.1007/s10551-011-07664.

115

Dormady, Noah and Gabriel Englander. “Carbon Allowances and the Demand for Offsets: a Comprehensive Assessment
of Imperfect Substitutes.” Journal of Public Policy, vol. 36, no. 1, 2015, pp. 139–167.,
doi:10.1017/s0143814x14000336.

Gillenwater, Michael, Derik Broekhoff, Mark Trexler, Jasmine Hyman, and Rob Fowler. “Policing the Voluntary Carbon
Market.” Nature Climate Change, vol. 1, no. 711, 2007, pp. 85–87., doi:10.1038/climate.2007.58.

González-Ramírez, Jimena, Catherine L. Kling, and Adriana Valcu-Lisman. “An Overview of Carbon Offsets from
Agriculture.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 4, no. 1 (2012): 145–60. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevresource-083110-120016.

Gruber, Jonathan. Public Finance and Public Policy. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2019.

Kotchen, Matthew. “Oﬀsetting Green Guilt .” Stanford Social Innovation Review, 2009,
ssir.org/articles/entry/offsetting_green_guilt.

Kotchen, Matthew. “Voluntary Provision of Public Goods for Bads: A Theory of Environmental Offsets.” The Economic
Journal, vol. 119, no. 537, 2009, pp. 883–899., doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02215.x.

Lovell, Heather C. “Governing the Carbon Offset Market.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, vol. 1, no.
3, 2010, pp. 353–362., doi:10.1002/wcc.43.

116
Mason, Charles, and Andrew Plantinga. “Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality.”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, vol. 16963, 2011, doi:10.3386/w16963.

Pinkse, Jonatan, and Timo Busch. “The Emergence of Corporate Carbon Norms: Strategic Directions and Managerial
Implications.” Thunderbird International Business Review, vol. 55, no. 6, 2013, pp. 633–645.,
doi:10.1002/tie.21580.

Ramseur, Jonathan. “Voluntary Carbon Offsets: Overview and Assessment .” Congressional Research Service, vol.
RL34241, 2009, doi:https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34241.pdf.

Seeberg-Elverfeldt, Christina. “Carbon Finance Possibilities for Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use Projects in a
Smallholder Context.” Natural Resources Management and Environment Department Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2010, pp. 5–9., doi:http://www.fao.org/3/i1632e/i1632e.pdf.

Sigman, Hilary, and Howard Chang. “The Effect of Allowing Pollution Offsets with Imperfect Enforcement.” 2011,
doi:10.3386/w16860.

Stern, Nicholas. “Public Economics as If Time Matters: Climate Change and the Dynamics of Policy.” Journal of Public
Economics, vol. 162, 2018, pp. 4–17., doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.03.006.

“VCS Again Voted Best Voluntary Standard, Leads in Voluntary Market Transactions.” Verra, June 9, 2016.
https://verra.org/vcs-again-voted-best-voluntary-standard-leads-in-voluntary-market-transactions

117

The Encounter - Deirdre Sullivan, Gettysburg College

